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SUMMARY
This report presents the results of an airline study of the advanced technology
requirements for an advanced high speed commercial transport engine. This report
is one of a series of three reports developed as a part of the NASA Advanced Trans-
port Technology Program. This specific report covers the results of American
Airlines' Phase I study effort which includes the following:
a. An airline's major objectives- fpr -future transport engines are presented
including the major challenges faced in -subsonic commercial aircraft pro-
pulsion technology.
b. An airline method of evaluating engine proposals is discussedtto provide
insight into the relative importance of various engine design and in-
stallation factors:.-,.. , . -.;.;...-:; . - •
c. A discussion of engine performance problems, experience, with performance
^ degradation and the results of a number of programs undertaken to reduce
the increase in specific fuel consumption that occurs with time.
•d. The trends in engine and pod prices with time and complexity and the
validity of current economic assessment tools in estimating the main-
tenance cost of advanced engines.
e. A discussion of the research objectives in five major technology areas
where improvements could produce economic benefits. Current experience
and cost impact data are presented as the basis for a discussion of the
research objectives for composites, reversers, fuel controls, advanced
components and for control of engine stall.
Introduction . ..'
The overall Intent of NASA Lewis Research Contract NAS3-15572 with American
Airlines was directed at -obtaining a comprehensive airline review of the studies
conducted by Pratt and Whitney and the General Electric companies covering the
engine requirements for advanced technology transport aircraft. These studies
were directed at determining the technological areas that had the greatest poten-
tial for signficant benefits to society through reduced pollution and noise, and
improved aircraft/engine economics by the application of advanced research.
To this end airline input, with its inherent differences in perspective, could
provide additional information upon which to base and plan advanced projects.
In addition it was expected that the airlines might have general long-
standing problems which could provide additional areas for the meaningful expendi-
ture of research effort to advance the general state of propulsion .technology.
The airline industry has grown to where it is a vital part of the national trans-
portation system and the sale of commercial aircraft to foreign countries a vital
part of national trade. The continued success of the sales of U.S. manufactured
aircraft and engines to foreign countries/airlines is to a large extent dependent
on the ability to produce a more efficient product. This contract was considered
as part of an initial probe and an innovative attempt towards, improving the research
planning process.
The information covered in this report is directed at fulfilling Task I of
the above mentioned contract.
This report is divided into four major sections.
I. The first section presents a description of an optimum engine for an
advanced transcontinental and intercontinental near sonic commercial
transport. It contains a description of the engine cycle, the critical
design features, the installation concepts, the estimated engine and
propulsion system price, and pollution and noise requirements for such
an engine.
II. The second section details the engine performance and economic ex-
periences that have occurred with the introduction of new engine type's
into American Airlines service. This section provides information
that is pertinent to the emphasis placed on these two factors in the
selection of an optimum engine.
III. The third section details airline experience and objectives in five
major technology areas which are felt to be the most productive areas
for advanced research effort.
IV. The last section is a comprehensive review of the ATT Engine Study Con-
tractors Phase 1 Study Reports and an airlines view of the contractors
recommendations. *
A. Objectives for Future Commercial Engines
The airlines continue to desire improved engines with improved performance.
At the same time the environmental concerns of the nation place emphasis on re-
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ducing the impact of aircraft and airports on surrounding communities to an ac-
ceptable level while maintaining the economic soundness of each new design.
The emphasis of the past for improved performance has reduced in relative im-
portance while noise, pollution, maintainability and reliability have in-
creased. The technology for subsonic aircraft engines has arrived at a point
that further advancements of the order of magnitude achieved in the change from
jets to low bypass ratio fans and then high bypass ratio fans is not readily
foreseen. This does not mean however that improvements cannot be achieved, but
that the expenditure of effort into perhaps more productive areas heretofore
overlooked is expected to be more productive. The cost of modern engines and
aircraft emphasizes the requirement for high utilization. To have an aircraft
delayed in service for an hour due to a faulty switch or indicator and thus incur
a loss of thousands of dollars is patently ridiculous if the reliability could
have been improved by the investment of a few more dollars, or if rapid fault
isolation could have been provided and rapid changeout effected. In total the
problems facing the airlines is achieving the proper balance of all factors with the
final objective of producing efficient transportation at a profit. The de-
cision-making tools for this increased complexity have not yet been con-
structed to provide the data for such decision-making processes. Experience
and intuitive feel are necessary and are the prime factor in decision-making
at this time.
It should be understood that significant advancements in specific fuel
consumption and thrust to weight performance are required for supersonic aircraft
and for STOL and VTOL propulsion systems. The noise constraints for these air-
craft types will produce heavy penalties unless the technology is found to re-
duce the noise efficiently. The technological fallouts from effort in these
areas will produce benefit in conventional subsonic aircraft but research effort
in the fundamental areas to produce more thrust at less total weight and better
fuel consumption are most appropriately directed at these latter aircraft types men-
tioned above.
B. Airline Approach to Engine Evaluation
American Airlines like others formally evaluate each new engine proposal
in great depth. Propulsion represents 20 to 25% of new aircraft prices.
Engine maintenance is 48 to 50% of the total aircraft maintenance expenditure.
The following provides the general headings and descriptions of the .significant
points of.evaluation and the type of considerations made during recent eval-
uations .
1. System Characteristics and Installation Compatibility
This area of evaluation includes the general design concept of the
engine in terms of the number of spools, bearings, blades, cooling
provisions, variable geometry, bleeds, combustion chambers and
fuel nozzles, customer bleed provisions, overall weight, length,
diameter and the flexibility and complexity of the resulting engine
installation. Included in this area is the engines ability to meet
the bleed and power extraction demands.
2. System Operation and Safety
This area of evaluation includes the engine operating envelope, stall
margin, transient performance, idle thrust level and variation with
temperature, engine control system capabilities to produce the rated
performance and prevent overspeed and overtemperature conditions as major
items. In terms of safety the foreign object ingestion capability and
probable resulting secondary damage, fire hazard and heat rejection from
the case, and air restart capabilities are assessed along with blade
containment provisions.
3. Propulsion System Performance, Pollution (Air Pollution and Noise) and
Growth Potential
In evaluating the performance commitment for the engine several major areas
are assessed in addition to the direct comparison of uninstalled perform-
ance between contending engines. The performance of the engine is cal-
culated from cycle data provided and an attempt is made to determine the
amount of margin available for failure to meet component performance ob-
jectives. Using the best information available on the state-of-the-art in
compressor, fan and turbine design, the performance of the engine can
be calculated. This level versus quoted guaranteed level provides
some indication of the risk associated in achieving guaranteed per-
formance. Strong preference is given to comparing the installed engine
performance. . at off design point operating conditions since aircraft
normally use altitudes and airspeeds for cruise that vary widely from
an isolated design point. Long term performance is a key issue in these
evaluations. Design features which are critical to achieving the engine
performance must be maintainable over the life of the engine. Con-
tractor commitments in terms of smoke and noxious gas emission levels
are compared as are the projected noise levels commitments. As a final
item the ability of the engine to achieve easy growth is assessed to
insure that major design changes which would effect the pod or basic
engine structure are avoided and that there is assurance that if the
aircraft grows during the development cycle that aircraft performance
can be maintained without water injection or significantly reducing
engine life. Good growth potential is necessary to maintaining a sound
economic engine development and production program over many years.
4. Power Plant Package
The willingness of the contractors to undertake a large part, if not
all, of the total power plant responsibility is evaluated. Until
recently the majority of engine contractors provided only the bare
engine. Engine performance is critically affected by inlet and nozzle
performance and engine life by the power extracted from the engine
based on aircraft instrumentation. The position traditionally taken is no
longer acceptable to the airlines. This assessment includes the
complexity, design concept, accessibility and maintainability of the
engine as installed. The reverser design, cost, life and maintain-
ability are also items for consideration.
5 -. Engine Design and Subsystem Requirements •
The total engine design assembly by assembly is reviewed for repair-
ability, maintainability, and reliability. The fuel system, oil
system, flanges, rotor design, bearing design, thrust balance, seal
design, etc. are reviewed for compliance with airline needs. Par-,
ticular attention is paid to the integrity of structural members,
repairability or replaceability of high wear areas, applicability for
wide scope sectionalization of the engine, inclusion of on-the-wing
inspection and diagnostic aids, simplicity or justifiable complexity
for assembly, maintenance and repair, and high cost components and
repair potential. The estimated repair costs for high cost items are
used as one of the many comparisons. Further, the disassembly and as-
sembly elapsed and total manhour estimates are reviewed and compared.
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The other areas evaluated are the reliability program, the maintenance and
repair procedure development programs, materials and airline experience there-
with, engine developmental test program with particular emphasis placed on
cyclic testing for low cycle fatigue, the development risk, economics (price/
delivery/financial terms), warranty programs and content, and technical and spare
part support based on past experience.
Airline evaluations place heavy emphasis on engine economics. Repairability,
maintainability, reliability and long term performance retention are the keys to
a successful commercial engine. This report is directed at defining the objectives
for advanced engines. The current airline state-of-the-art in achieving the key
parameters listed above is discussed to provide an improved understanding of the
basis for the many requirements presented.
SECTION I
Description of a Recommended Optimum Engine for a Future Mach No. 0.98.
Commercial Transport Aircraft
'A. Introduction
The engine selection process must consider a multitude of factors in ar-
riving at a final "optimum" selection. These factors include technical,
economic, environmental, reliability and maintainability considerations
as well as an assessment of risk. The engine described herein was selected
as optimum for a Mach No. 0.95 to 0.98 aircraft on the basis of including
a moderate level of risk. Commensurate with a late 1970 decade introduc-
tion the selection was based on the data provided in the ATT engine con-
tractor reports and internal American Airlines sources.
The overall mission requirements of the ATT Engine Study included both
intercontinental and international range aircraft where engine specific
fuel consumption is of high importance. Further, the objective of re-
ducing aircraft noise below current FAR Part 36 limits places an additional
heavy burden in arriving at the selection of an engine cycle.
The airlines desire continued advances in the state-of-the-art but are cautious
of involving more than one or two relatively new advancements in any new
engine. The failure to achieve guaranteed performance levels or. needed
engine life and reliability involve both customers and contractors in
expensive problems (poor scheduling reliability, late aircraft delivery, etc.)
which can ill be afforded. The environmental problems faced and their solu-
tions must not penalize the aircraft economics so greatly that the new air-
craft represents little if any advantage over older aircraft. Progress in
noise and pollution reduction must be tempered with these practical con-
straints while producing continued reduction in the environmental impact
of each succeeding aircraft and engine type. Lastly, engine price and
maintenance cost must be minimized to the maximum extent possible. In-
corporation of many technological advancements in a single new engine in-
variably increases both first cost and the cost of maintenance.
B. Recommended Cycle for an Optimum Engine for an Advanced Mach 0.95 to 0.98
Transport Engine
The recommended optimum engine for a Mach 0.95 to 0.98 commercial transport
of both domestic and international range capability would have the follow-
ing cycle characteristics:
Bypass Ratio - 4.5 to 4.7
Fan Pressure Ratio - 1.80 to 1.85
Overall Cycle Pressure
Ratio - 26 to 28
Turbine Inlet Temp.
at Cruise Condition
ISA + 10°C - 2300° to 2350°F
Non-mixed flow with nominally coplaner nozzles
This single cycle design point was selected based on the following con-
siderations .
1. The cycle is near optimum for either long range or domestic
aircraft and produces the largest core engine to meet the
aircraft customer air bleed and horsepower demands.
2. The cycle represents the lowest bypass ratio consistent
with realistic single stage fan state-of-the-art performance
projected for the envisioned time period. (This is an
identifiable area of risk and the envisioned fan would use
composite blading.)
3. The aircraft is expected to make full use of operating pro-
cedures to reduce noise and to have a heavier aircraft thrust
loading as a result of a minimum of 37,000 ft. altitude start
of cruise ceiling objective at maximum takeoff gross weight.
The cycle therefore represents a good balance to achieve the
takeoff and approach noise objectives.
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4. The modest increase in turbine inlet temperature selected assures
early margin for growth as engine durability is demonstrated or
if early aircraft growth requires. The thermal efficiency ad-
vantages produced by higher temperature are insufficient to
justify the inherent risk of short life in high pressure turbine and
combustor parts. Further, the lower temperature and modest pres-
sure ratio are consistent with reducing the formation of nitrogen
oxides (NOX) since combustor design technology should produce re-
duction of a significant magnitude without the use of water in-
jection.
5- The anti-icing bleed air demands for inlet acoustic treatment and
engine handling qualities can be more easily satisified with a larger
core engine (low bypass ratio).
6. It is inescapable that conservatism produces better life and opera-
tional efficiency. Engine manufacturers have extreme difficulty
in finding risk capital financing. The commercial engine develop-
ment programs have been of shorter duration (fewer total hours) with
more limited developmental testing than is normally planned for high
technology military developments. Further only one engine would be
developed to fulfill both aircraft requirements so that a suitable
total market would be provided.
7. The fan, advanced combustor for pollution control, and noise control
features represent the major risk areas. The compressor pressure
ratio and turbine inlet temperature are more conservative in rela-
tionship to the advancements required. It is essential that the
objectives for future compressor development be directed at minimum
complexity, minimum cost, excellent stall margin and long term perform-
ance and for turbines improved turbine cooling effectiveness, improved
materials and cooling concepts, and long life seal clearance control.
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The selected cycle is compatible with this objective.
8. Although engine size was not selected as it is relatively unim-
portant at this point, the maximum neutral quick engine change
configuration must not exceed 96 inches (8 feet) in diameter to
permit unrestricted over-the-road transportation by truck. The
lower bypass ratio is in the direction of more easily satisfying
this requirement
C. Recommended Installation Concept
1. General Configuration - It is recommended that the installation con-
sider the use of a long duct nacelle. This configuration is com-
patible in concept with both wing and body installation positions
and with mixed flow or non-mixed flow final nozzles. This configura-
tion also provides the opportunity for using the total powerplant on
several aircraft types. The following paragraphs discuss additional
factors which are applicable to this concept.
2. Inlets - The desired inlet would have a length to diameter ratio ex-
ceeding or equal to 1 with a fixed lip and no acoustic rings. The
acoustic treated barrel section of the inlet would be the structural
load carrying member of the inlet transmitting all loads to the fan
case front flange. The barrel section acoustic treatment should be
replaceable in sections. Acoustic inlet rings are specifically not
desired, however, if they are mandated they should be stowable/retract-
able for cruise and climb conditions. The engine bullet nose/spinner
should be acoustically treated and considerably longer, perhaps 0.640
of the max diameter, to preclude the need for two splitters by pro-
viding a lower passage height and thus a proper L/H ratio for
acoustic treatment effectiveness. Early R&D is necessary to integrate
the total inlet designs and fan aerodynamic designs into an optimum
performing system.
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3. Fan Cowl - Externally mounted accessories, mounted external to the
core engine, are required. The fan cowl should provide the en-
closure, with appropriate access doors, for the accessories if fan
case mounted. If the engine is mixed flow external mounting is
obviously required. In both cases the cowl should be supported by
the pylon and remain with the aircraft during engine change.
4. Pylon - The pylon, whether for wing or body mounted engines should
be designed to transmit thrust loads from the fan frame to the
structure. Services should be segregated with electrical, instrumenta-
tion and pneumatics at a higher elevation than fluids (i.e. fuel and
hydraulic).
5. Long Cowls/Fan Ducts - For non-mixed flow engines the long cowl-fan ducts
should be an integral assembly split and supported from the pylon. Pre-
ferably the fan nozzle, reverser assembly, ducts, and acoustic treat-
ment would be an integrated assembly of the lightest possible weight
consistent with the overall 30,000 hour minimum life requirements. Long
life sealing of the ducts to preclude overboard leakage of fan airflow
is a critical design item.
6. Final Nozzles - Final nozzles shapes should be consistent with minimum
afterbody drag, long term performance and should be easily adjustable
to maintain proper area for best average engine performance versus time.
The allowable maximum afterbody boattail half angles are estimated to
be no greater than 7 on the upper quadrant and 9° on the lower
quadrant (underside). This feature must be validated by powered model
testing.
7. Reverser - Strong preference is given for a hydraulic actuated, single
target type reverser which will reverse both streams of a non-mixed
flow engine and is recommended for mixed flow engine. The design per-
formance objective should be 45% of the takeoff gross thrust with a
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minimum acceptable level of 40%. Noise levels in maximum reverse
thrust must not -exceed the sideline takeoff thrust noise require-
ments. This approach is consistent with minimum weight, first .
cost and continued maintenance cost. The cost for maintaining the
reverser should not exceed 0.5 dollars per flight.
8. Acoustic Design - The above stated recommendations are consistent with
meeting the noise treatment requirements of future aircraft. Long
ducts provide for aft fan noise suppression treatment and the pos-
sibility of improved mixing noise control from non-mixed flow
engines. The long inlet and long bullet nose should preclude the
need for more than one acoustic splitter. Requirements for turbine
noise treatment can be met with inner nozzle wall treatment.
9. Position Mounting - The recommended configuration requirements are
consistent with wing and side body mounted engines. The center engine
position for a three engine configuration differs only in that the
longer inlet, either DC-10 or L-1011 configurations, precludes the
need for acoustic splitters. Special position builds are to be
avoided. The need to dress an engine differently for right or left,
inboard or outboard or tail installation position requires additional
spares support and increases costs for maintenance and ownership.
D. Installation Power Extraction Requirements
The following are general recommended guides to the power extraction re-
quirements for advanced transports and should be .considered:estimates.
Final detailed levels should be established from test and final aircraft de-
sign. However, if errors are to be made in original estimates it is im-
portant that they be on the side of too great an extraction demand.
1. Bleed Air - The requirement is established as 22 to 25 cubic feet
per minute of fresh air per passenger or an estimated 3 pounds per
second Interstage bleed per engine for engines in the 40 thousand pound
thrust class. This level is consistent with increasing public pres-
sure for segregation of smokers.and non-smokers and for non-
mixing of the airflows to insure minimum airflow recirculation. In
addition the following additional bleed/flows are estimated single
engine extraction levels for inlet and aircraft anti-icing.
Sea Level 25,000 Ft.
Inlet Duct 2.0 Ib./sec. 1.5 Ib./sec.
Inlet Duct & Splitter
Single 2.5 Ib./sec. 2.00 Ib./sec..
Double 3.25 Ib./sec. 2.75 Ib./sec.
Wing 2.75 Ib./sec. 2.0 Ib./sec.
Note: Engine anti-icing is not included in the levels estimated above.
The compressor must be designed to provide these bleed flows with
minimum losses. Air conditioning bleed is always provided and the
design should consider bleed air from the outset. Further, a suf-
ficient number of engine bleed air positions on the compressor
should be provided to eliminate the need for a precooler providing
weight and possibly cost advantages. Fan bleed for the CSD*oil heat
exchanger and the air conditioning system precooler is required if air
conditioning bleed air exceeds 450°F. The precooler if required shall
not be mounted on the engine.
2. Mechanical Power - Initial designs should provide for a minimum of
200 horsepower extraction sufficient to drive the CSD/Alternator,
two hydraulic pumps, 1 fuel vapor eductor pump.
E. Engine Mechanical Design
The following lists a number of design items which are considered critical
in the design for future engines;
^Constant speed drive. • .
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1- Compressor Case Temperatures - The compressor case temperatures
should be maintained at less than 550°F for fire safety. Al-
ternatively case insulation or double walling of flammable
fluid lines must be provided.
2- Compressor Bleeds - A preference is shown for providing all customer
air bleed from a single port at each of the required compressor stations.
Such bleed air should be tapped from the inner diameter of the compressor
to avoid contamination. Strong preference is also given for locating
the compressor bleeds in such a way as to eliminate the need for a
bleed air precooler. The proper location and sizing of bleed ports
as well as the stage or stages of the compressor from which bleed air
should be taken requires careful and early consideration in compressor
design.
3. Engine Windmilling Power Extraction - Unless adequate windmilling power
is available to drive the aircraft hydraulic system, alternative sources
such as drop out generators, or battery driven hydraulic systems must be
added to the aircraft. This requirement comes from the powered controls
of modern aircraft and the need to insure aircraft control under an all
engine out condition. Design provisions to insure the availability of
high pressure rotor rotation of sufficient speed to extract hydraulic
power should be provided.
4. Compressor and Turbine Tip Clearance Control - Compressor and turbine
performance is dependent upon clearance control and control over
extraneous leakage. Long life in current designs has not been achieved
and early performance loss has been the result.
5. Rotor Support and Bearing Location - Many advanced engine designs
employ the concept of supporting'the high pressure turbine on the
low pressure turbine shaft. This concept permits a lighter engine
than would otherwise be possible; The problems foreseen with this
design approach is that wear of the bearing surfaces will play a
large factor in turbine tip clearance control and that bearing failure
could have potentially disasterous effects. As such American
wants nothing to do with this type of design at this time. It is possible
that a reversal of opinion can be obtained if the design concept is
proven over a long period of time in military operation and that
long endurance testing of. a large number of samples proves safety
and reliability. This possibility is not foreseen however and
alternate design approaches are preferred even at the expense of
weight. As part of any design the turbine must never be capable of
spinning to destruction. The design must provide for rearward move-
ment upon shaft failure such that the turbine engages the static
structure and brings the turbine to an all but instantaneous stop.
6. Case Flanges and Leakage - Case flanges must have special provisions for
long term sealing, restoration of surfaces and extra material for such
restoration. Flange leakage with age and the use of different cases in
assembly must be taken into consideration in the initial design.
7. Rotating Assemblies - The use' of dowel bolts for alignment and carrying
centrifugal loads in rotating assemblies is not acceptable. Rabbeted
joints are preferred. Reference surfaces not subject to wear shall be
provided on all required parts for use in checking alignment.
8. Provisions for Internal Inspection -
Unobstructed access for borescoping all stages of the compressor, com-
bustor and turbine shall be provided. Additionally the use of radio
isotope and X-ray techniques for inspection should be considered in
IT
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the initial design.
9. Fire Protection - The possibility of case burn through must be con-
sidered in the initial design. Means for detecting such a burn
through need to be developed. The use of acoustic or vibration
sensors must be investigated as possible means of detection.
Generally, it is expected that a liquid nitrogen fire extinguishing
system will be used. The seriousness of the exposure of hot cases,
etc. to 1^2 needs investigation.
10. Oil System - The design of the oil system must consider minimizing
the possibility of internal oil leakage due to mis-assembly of parts,
to this end 0-rings on internal oil transfer tubes are forbidden
as are brazed connections. Mechanical connections are required on
all internal tubing.
11. Fuel System - The fuel control system must be fully capable of managing
engine performance throughout the engine operating envelope. It must
provide the capability of allowing full throttle takeoffs without ex-
ceeding the rating scheme and provide climb and cruise power at fixed
throttle position without regard for the temperature lapse rate with
altitude or airspeed. Additionally, the control must prevent overspeed
and overtemperature of the engine.
12. Engine Starting - The engine must be equipped with a starter that will
provide a thirty-second start after 4000 starts for minimum pollution
control,
Propulsion System and Engine Prices
There are many factors which affect the price of a new engine,not the least
of which is the amount of development work that must be undertaken and the
number of basic and variant engines which are projected to be sold. These
factors plus the competition in the market place have perhaps the largest
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bearing on prices. Pod system prices have not been as openly competitive
in the past and are normally buried in the price of the aircraft. Emphasis
was placed on requiring the engine manufacturer to be responsible for the
total power plant during the recent competition for the DC-lO/L-1011,and
comparison of the engine prices was expanded to include total pod prices.
This pressure and the quoted pod prices came as a revelation to the engine
manufacturers and to the airlines.
The major cost elements in the pod are the inlet and nozzle system. The
nozzle system includes the reverser. The overall price level has increased
versus time as emphasis has been increased on the structural design life of
these items from their original level of nominally 2000 hours to in excess
of 30,000 hours. The reverser must be designed for the same time between
major maintenance objectives as the engine. Reverser nozzle assemblies in
the past appear to price at approximately 100 dollars a pound of weight. The
addition of acoustic material will increase the price upward toward
150 dollars per pound for future designs. For all practical purposes the
inlet systems should be considered to cost approximately 150 dollars a
pound when acoustically treated with wall treatment alone. Price increases
towards the two hundred dollar a pound level are anticipated. Basic cowling
runs 90 to 100 dollars a pound. The largest element of these prices is the
engineering and tooling non-recurring write-off that occurs over the first
production airplanes, up to the production breakeven point. The costs for the
pod are therefore written off over a very small number of units in comparison
to the traditional method employed in the past for writing off engine develop-
ment costs. The objective for future aircraft is to design a power package
that is usable on many aircraft models so that these high non-recurring costs
need not be repeated for each new aircraft type.
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Reviewing past engine prices in an effort to produce cost estimating
trends has been quite unproductive because of the large variations in
circumstances which existed at the time the development started. The
existence of a developed core engine from which the new engine can be
developed is perhaps one of the largest development cost savings. The major
development cost area lies in high pressure compressor development followed
closely with high pressure turbine development cost. Poor experience or
development problems in other component areas can and have escalated
development cost far above projections and can change this general rule of
thumb.
In reviewing advanced technology to determine the potential rewards that
can be achieved by increasing engine temperatures, pressure ratios or bypass
ratio it is at best quite difficult to assess the effects of these changes
on engine price. The following general expressions, however, are used by
American Airlines for long range planning purposes and for taking a first
cut at comparing the prices quoted by manufacturers for realism. Increasing
overall cycle pressure ratio tends to increase the price of an engine by the
cube root of the design pressure ratio divided by a base level of twenty
(OCPR/20)' . Increasing turbine inlet temperature has the unexpected ef-
fect of reducing engine price as the thrust increase produced by the
temperature increase is more rapid than the price increase for combustion
chamber and turbine parts. However maintenance cost which tend to be
dominated by turbine and combustor hardware replacement on repair costs is
adversely affected. For the future this relationship of reduced first cost
due to turbine temperature increases is not expected to hold. The basis for
this projection is that the manufacturing and material costs are expected to
increase more rapidly than in the past as higher and higher levels of turbine
cooling effectiveness are sought to minimize cooling airflow losses. The
relationship for the effect of turbine inlet temperature increases on engine
price has in the past been following the cube root of the design temperature
20
in degrees Rankine divided into 2260°R, (2260/TIT)'
The effect of varying bypass ratio on engine price is to increase the
price with increasing bypass ratio as larger blades and cases and more
low pressure turbine stages .are required. The relationship of price to
bypass ratio is that the price increases approximately as the fourth root
\.
of the design bypass ratio divided by 4, (BPR/4) . The cost changes
associated with two stage fan engines are roughly 108% of the single stage
fan engine price for the same takeoff thrust.
The overall equation for estimating engine price in terms of dollars per
pound of takeoff thrust is as follows for a base level 40,000 pound thrust
engine flat rated to 90 F at sea level static conditions.
where x = 1.00 single stage fans and 1.08 for two stage fans
and y = 20.5 for low risk development programs where all components
are demonstrated and an available core engine of the
proper size is in hand
y = 22,5 for medium risk programs where scaling of core engines
and modest changes to other components are required
y = 26.5 for high risk programs requiring a new core engine or
more than two new undemonstrated components
Scaling of the engine price to fit other engine thrust classes can be
accomplished between 25000 Ib. and 65000 Ibs. of thrust by multiplying
/ *j,c c-<? t" \ •3'3
by the following factor I •^ I
^ f-" r.<-> '
The engines for an ATT are expected to. be priced at $950,000 to 1 million
per engine. The total powerplant at 1.4 to 1.5 million. However strong
pressure will be placed on driving the price for the complete powerplant to
$25 per pound of installed thrust.
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G. Noise and Pollution Design Requirements
The noise level objectives which must be guaranteed are a function of the
projected state-of-the-art. "Guarantees" and "technical objectives"however
are different. The technical objective is to incorporate all known noise
reduction features that can be economically installed. The guaranteed noise
levels are normally higher by 3 decibels than the level which is technically
judged reasonable to achieve. The following is the expected guarantee noise
level requirement related to Appendix C of FAR-36 and the introductory year
of aircraft operation.
Year Level
1975 to 1978 FAR 36 minus 5 EPNdB
1978 to 1981 FAR 36 minus 8 EPNdB
1981 to 1984 FAR 36 minus 11 EPNdB
The achievement of these levels will require the use of operating procedures
to minimize noise. Equally the design of the aircraft to avoid a high drag land-
ing configuration is essential. The major overall objective will continue to
be the reduction of the area enclosed by the 100 EPNdB contour in a uniform
manner until the contour is completely within the airport boundary. Considera-
tion must be given to the noise level produced by reverse thrust operation
on the ground which must not exceed the sideline levels covered by the re-
quirements stated above. The noise and pollution emission produced by the
auxiliary power units must equally be controlled. The noise level at the
cargo doors caused by APU operation must be controlled to a maximum of 80 dBA
for the future and the internal noise level within the cabin during flight
must be reduced slightly from the current levels in terms of speech interfer-
ence (SIL).
The main challenge in pollution control will be to reduce the formation of
emission at the source and to further control emissions by proper oper-
ating procedures. Starting characteristics are considered important in odor
formation. To this end rapid flame propagation and high stability
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of the combustion process are Important during starting as is an adequate
engine starting system to produce quick starts. Automatic starting systems
should be considered for future engines. There must be no overboard drains
from future engines with the exception of the false start combustion chamber
drain. Specific design attention must be given to oil vapor and bearing
seal drains of the engine and accessories to minimize this source of pollu-
tion. Heavy engine breathing during initial operation which allows the escape
of oil mists must be more closely controlled. The NASA stated targets for
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon are reasonable "technical goals", however the
forthcoming Environmental Protection Agency Rules will be the required
"guarantee levels" for future engines. High idle thrust levels and the use
of water injection as pollution control devices are considered to be a last
resort measure only. High idle thrust, a level that exceeds approximately 6%
of the takeoff thrust, involve ramp safety problems and general brake wear
problems that are undesirable. Water injection for nitrogen oxide control
is effective but only while the water is used. The objective must be set on
advanced combustion system designs which insure a more realistic solution
and provide benefits throughout the operating envelope of the aircraft.
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SECTION II
Engine Performance and Costs '
A. Introduction
This section addresses historical propulsion system performance problems
and maintenance costs in an effort to provide a better appreciation for
the effects of technology as observed from an airline engineering point
of view. The performance and cost history is the experience of American
Airlines and it should be expected that other airlines would produce data
which differed in minor ways. The experiences however are representative
and an understanding of the trends is vital to understanding why airlines
take a conservative position on introduction of advanced technology; and
the reasons behind the strong current emphasis placed on engine reliability
and economics,
The general conclusion that has been drawn from this review is that specifically
for an advanced subsonic commercial aircraft the avenues open to improve air-
craft power plant operating economics are not the traditional areas of im-
proved specific fuel consumption and engine weight. It will be far more
cost effective to place research emphasis on achieving a propulsion system that
utilizes those features to improve performance that are consistent with the
overall objectives of very high reliability, low maintenance costs, minimum
pollution and excellent long term performance retention. It is unfortunate
that the current methods of assessing aircraft economics do not provide means
for indicating the tangible benefits associated with these objectives.
There is every indication that the trends in engine performance deterioration
and in maintenance cost have increased exponentially with improvements in
technology. While it is recognized that the total experience with the new
high bypass engines is less than would be desirable to draw firm conclusions,
and that the current problems can and will be resolved by the manufacturers
and airlines; there is sufficient indication that unless a high level of
effort is placed on reversing these trends during the initial design pro-
cess the airlines can ill affor-d "advanced technology."
B. Problems with Engine Performance Development and Retention
Records associated with the problems of achieving engine performance during
the development of JT3C/J57 series engines widely used on commercial aircraft
have not been maintained. Early records from the military will undoubtedly
disclose that serious problems existed in achieving performance with this
new two spool engine. The commercial JT3D turbofan version of the engine was
developed from the J57 by applying the first two stages of the ANP demonstra-
tor engine to the low pressure spool and adding low pressure turbine stages
(switching to the T57 turbo prop low pressure turbine). Considerable per-
formance experience was in hand before contractual commitments were made on what
the engine should produce. The JT8D engine was derived from the J52 military
developed engine. Engi.ne performance levels were guaranteed before the engine
was well in hand and extreme difficulty was faced in achieving the stated per-
formance. The aft fan version of the J79, the CJ805-23, developed for the
Convair 990 produced performance as required but was short of life and it was
not until the engine was essentially derated in-service that engine life was
brought to a reasonable level. Performance of the JT9D engine was committed
long before real development started and the performance guarantees were set
at a level that proved impossible to meet with early production engines. The
inability to deliver early engines with performance margins produced engines
which operated above planned temperatures and resulted in shorter lives than
would otherwise be expected. These characteristics are costly to the airlines
and the manufacturers in terms of high engine removal rates and high replace-
ment parts costs. The engines of the future must be committed to realistic
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guarantees with sufficient "margins for errors".
1. Rigs to Engine - Normally it is the practice of U.S. engine manufacturers
to base proposed engine performance guarantees on projected and demon-
strated component rig performance. This practice is not used by foreign
manufacturers as traditionally the time available to develop an engine
and the funds available to do so are more restricted. They follow instead
the practice of debiting each engine component rig performance level by
a minimum of one percent in efficiency. Experience has
indicated that they have been unable to generate rig performance in the
finished production engine within the time and budget limitations that
existed.
2. High Bypass Ratio Engines - The current generation of high bypass ratio
engines at first engine run all operated at a point roughly 15% above
their engine specific fuel consumption guarantees. The TF-39, the parent
of the CF-6, is addressed here as being the appropriate point of reference.
The RB-211, JT9D and TF39 programs all reached an equivalent point of
about 4% over commitments in about 15 months of development effort. The
TF39 eventually reached its committed performance, the JT9D did not and
missed performance by about 2%. The RB-211 story is not yet complete.
Certification performance levels will be presented shortly and there is
a strong possibility that the engine will be initially placed in service
as a derated engine. It is probable that early RB-211 engines will be
above the required specific fuel consumption performance by approximately
two percent just as the early JT9D engines were. Heavy continuing ex-
penditures of research and development funds are required when the initial
engines are short on performance. Traditionally early service experience
will produce requirements for design changes that will adversely affect
performance. Such factors as combustor life may demand higher pressure
drop to provide adequate cooling for longer life,and turbine nozzle and
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blade cracking will require increased cooling airflow. Perhaps the
most difficult problem to face is the presence of inadequate stall
margins presenting the requirement for additional bleeds, revision
to bleed schedules, or restrictions on throttle movement and use of
reverse thrust.
3. Production Variation
Normal production engines have varied 1%7<, in airflow and 2% in specific
fuel consumption. The average production engine must therefore be at least
l%7o better in performance than specification minimums to avoid high pro-
duction rejection rates. In addition there must be a large temperature
margin between the worst production engine and the redline limit on
measured temperature. A 90 F tolerance is historically the minimum for
good operating flexibility. Production variations in spool speed and thrust
at minimum power setting parameter are all .part of production tolerenaces
that are expected. Figure 1 indicates the variations seen from reasonable
production size samples of engines.
4. Service Experience with Engine Performance
The development of engines to achieve their design performance commitments
is a difficult job with many hours spent with component rigs to finally
achieve each components objectives or to determine whether a given component
can carry the deficiency of another. The maintenance of engine performance
over long periods of operation has not been a problem faced by the military
services with the exception of those elements that conduct their operation
in a commercial airline fashion. Mechanical problems usually preclude long
hours of operation of military engines designed to achieve maximum per-
formance. The deterioration of engine performance with time is a serious
problem to the airlines. Efforts to correct performance problems in the
past have been short term and sporadic in nature and directed at getting
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Figure 1
The Average Variation for Production Engines
at Constant Sea Level Static Takeoff Thrust
JT3D
<• ..*) ± 85
.0-0 ± 98
+ 17°C
+ 2.1%
v + .017
JT8D
± 95
+ 159
+ 13°C
+ 1 .4%
+ 0.017
Spey
± 50
+ 90
+ 15°C
+ 1.5%
Not Available
JT9D
+ 40
+ 44
+ 12°C
+ 1.0%
+ 0.006
CF6-6D
± 25
+ 90
+ 22°C
+ 1.5%
+ .10*
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out of a specific problem. The science of achieving performance from
old parts in the most cost effective way has really been under develop-
ment for only the last three years. Progress in this field has been
hampered by a number of real problems.
The deterioration of performance on a total industry basis appears to
be as follows: a) the early JT3C, JT4C turbojet powered aircraft have
lost roughly 8% of their specific range capability at this time. Early
turbofan (JT3D, Conway) powered aircraft have lost between 4 and 570
and newer aircraft have lost 2.5 to 37= of their range capability. There
are no technical features that would indicate that these later engines are
superior to the early turbojets and that they will rust deteriorate
to the 87, or greater level as they continue to accumulate time. Early
indications are that the new breed of high bypass ratio engines are
worse, if anything, in terms of the rate at which performance deteriorates.
Performance loss in terms of aircraft specific range, a portion or all of
which is due to engine deterioration, is not the only problems faced as
engines grow older in service. Engine stall margin also deteriorates and
compressor reblading programs have been necessary to return engine stall
margin to a satisfactory level. Experience with the new breed of engines
gives little confidence that the newer technology has done anything to
improve the loss of stall margin with time. While production engines have
normal performance variations, the installation of the engines with
real aircraft nozzles, bleed systems, and instrumentation also produce real
and imaginary variations in the observed engine performance. Age and use
further produce losses and changes in performance through wear of seals,
erosion of blading and changes in aircraft airconditioning system perform-
ance to name but a few. None of these changes in observed engine per-
formance are uniform from engine to engine or are isolated to a given
engine component. As an example, although by design there is uniformity
29
in the amount of bleed air taken from each engine, in practice there
is a hogging of bleed air from one engine and a non-uniformity of off-
take from engine to engine on an aircraft. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the .
trend of aircraft and engine performance versus time. Introduction of new
engines of later-build-standard have helped to maintain the aircraft
fleet performance at a lower deterioration rate than would be produced
if all the engines were of the same age. When an airline's fleet has
reached its maximum size and the flow of new engines stops, the average
deterioration rate would be expected to increase. Figures 5, 6 and 7
show the average change in performance, for engines returned to service,
using new production engine performance as the base. Similar curves for
JT9D and CF-6 engines are not yet available due to lower total service
time accumulated to date. An unknown portion of aircraft performance
deterioration may be attributable to changes to inlets, nozzles and bleed
flow rates. The average installation effect for new production engines and
pods; and the effects observed with old hardware are shown for the JT3D
and JT8D in Figures 8 & 9. Figures 5 & 6 are test cell changes to which
the installation effects of Figures 8 & 9 must be added to obtain the ob-
served change. In general this data produces more questions than answers.
Research effort into this area of performance losses through deterioration.
could produce design guides for the future.
5. Experience with Performance Recovery in Spey Engines - A performance
recovery program was launched on the Spey engine to determine if some
of the average loss of specific fuel consumption could be regained. A
series of repairs were undertaken to determine the effects of each
individual repair on total engine performance.
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Figure 5
Average Engine Performance Referenced to Average New Production
Performance and One Sigma Bands at Takeoff Power
JT3D-1, MC6, MC7 JT3D-3B
A We O b / h r ) + 260 + 130 (3% + 1 5%) + 250 + 110 (2.6% + 1.2%)
A t6T(cr> +38° + 12° + 25° ±13°
-20 + 20A |V, A/6^ ,-?.*) +10 + 50
A Njt//^ (rp.vO +90 + 45 -40 + 50
A Ps^/Pt^ (<y{; + 1.5% + 1.3% ' !-4% ± IA7°
A Pif / PC,, C V.j + ^^ ± 2 '8% + '6% ± 2'°%
A Pif/ Pr-r C7J - 1-5% + 1.2% ' 1>5% ± 1>87°
Figure 6
Average Engine Performance Referenced to Average New Production
Performance and One Sigma Bands at Takeoff Power
A V/f (*M
A EGT ( "f;
A N , / V (5 C <" p iV< )
A J\l , /v £3. (f|*l1\
A P^/Pc^^^J
A P^/F,, CZ)
A P^/prnCZ}
JT8D-1/7
+ 170 + 80
+ 26°F + 10°F
+ 2 5 + 4 0
) - 15 + 65
+ 1.4% + 1.8%
- 17o + 2%
0 + 1%
JT8D-9
+ 280 + 90
+ 3 6 + 1 4
+ 5 + 30
0 + 50
+ ! % + ! %
- 1.5% +1.3%
- .7% + 15%
35
Figure 7
Average Engine Performance to Average New Production
Performance and One Sigma Bands at Takeoff Power
__. Spey MK 511-14
) +450 + 25
A IE 6T C* f) + 50 + 10°F
AN,//5 t iG>^ + 5 0 + 4 0
A N2//fei Ct-p-") - 1 0 + 5 0
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Figure 8.
Installation Effects' Observed Based
on Correlation of Test Cell and Installed Engine
Data at Takeoff EPR plus 1 Sigma Data Scatter
JT3D-1 (Average) JT3D-3B (Average *)
A W^ Ub/hr) + 675 + 325 + 300 + 300
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A M. (r j > f v » ) + 200 + 100 + 200 + 100
A N,J fp.>O + 50 + 100 + 70 + 100
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JT3D-3B Average**
A W^. ( lb/hr-> 480 + 400
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**Small door cowl
JT3D-3B Flight Test Data - New Engines Large Door Cowls
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Figure 9
Installation Effects Observed Based
on Correlation of Test Cell and Installed
Engine Data at Takeoff EPR plug 1 Sigma
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Based upon test cell data and installed performance trend monitoring programs
the fuel flow of the average Spey engine had increased by 3.57° above that
demonstrated by the engine as new. That level of increase represented an
increased annual expenditure of 350,000 dollars based on a fleet of approx-
imately 30 aircraft. Recognizing that modifications had been incorporated
in the engine to improve life and that some of these modifications had an
adverse affect upon performance there was still the possibility that a
sizeable portion of the loss could be recovered. The average time on the
engines at the time the program was initiated was 5000 hours with a few
engines having a service time accumulation of 6000 hours. The first modifica-
tion undertaken to the evaluation engine was to recontour the leading edges
of the low pressure compressor/fan blades. This modification reduced the fuel flow
by 0.5%. The second modification was to repaint the low compressor with
Nubelon -S Paint, This action improved the fuel flow by slightly greater
than 17, and two additional engines were produced with these two bills of
work. The improvements noted were 1.37=. and 27, lower takeoff fuel flow.
The low pressure compressor of the Spey engine has alumunium blading and it is
evident that blade erosion caused a significant loss in airflow and ef-
ficiency. The restoration of the leading edges and smoothing of the blade
surfaces by the application of paint brought the airflow presumably back
to the original level and improved the efficiency. The next bill of work
done on the test engine was to strip and repair the high pressure compressor
area and combustor. The repairs were made in accordance with the overhaul
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manual and no significant change was noted in performance. The incorporation
of an improved first stage turbine blade which was known to cause a per-
formance loss was tried next and evidenced the expected loss. The second
stage turbine turbine seal areas were reworked to minimum clearances and
the turbine flow area was closed by three percent. The first change improved
the fuel consumption by 1/370 and the second reduced the part power fuel con-
sumption although it had no significant effect on takeoff power. The total
program produced a reduction in fuel flow of about 2.5% with the major
contribution coming from the low compressor rework and turbine improvement,
i.e. minimum turbine seal clearances. Starting from a base of an average
of 3.5%, up on performance the improvements were considered signficant. Until
this point in time the airflow capacity of individual engines had not been
measured as a routine practice. Neither calibrated bellmouths or airflow
instrumentation existed for the purpose. The manufacturer estimated that
at that point in the service life of the engine the average engine had lost
2 to 2% percent of the original airflow capability in the low pressure com-
pressor. Titanium blading would probably have slowed the rate of deteriora-
tion. However, little is known about air flow losses in current engines to
be certain that the blade blending practices used to remove nicks are not the
major factor in airflow losses and that titanium blading in current engine
do not suffer from a similar problem.
6. Experience with Performance Recovery in the JT3D - An earlier program of a
similar nature was run on a JT3D engine. The performance recovery program
was a joint effort with Trans World Airlines investigating the hot components
and American investigating the compressor and fan components. This work is
reported in SAE Paper No.700329. The American program required 18 months to
complete due to the production nature of the overhaul and repair operation
taking precedence. Therefore long periods of time went by between discrete
engine runs. Further, the test cells instrumentation was not suf-
ficiently accurate to produce highly detailed performance data nor
were the engines configured for accepting additional instrumentation
in a manner to permit this type of research. Lastly the engine test
cell fuel system was poorly designed and not sufficiently accurate for
this type of work and was replaced as a result of the indications of this
weakness. Nonetheless the program produced useful results In terms of
telling American more about what was not known about engine performance
and what had to be learned If future programs were to produce results.
A summary of the observed results and the results speculated from the data
as follows:
The most significant effect of deteriorated compressor parts was the loss of
high compressor stall margin. It appeared possible to use blading eroded
to 0.040 In. without encountering stall problems on engines equipped with
twelfth stage bleed systems. There was no definable trend in performance that
would indicate that a performance loss had been encountered using blades of
this type. Beyond this point no firm conclusion was possible. Over the
period of time which elapsed the test cell undoubtedly shifted slightly In
calibration. One cannot be sure from the records that the same identical
bellmouth and reference tailpipes were used on each test, the fuel system was
known to be inaccurate, and airflow was not taken so that changes in fan and
compressor airflow capacity remain unknown. The TWA program was run more
quickly from May to October of 1969. The test work conducted by TWA on 1
the JT3D-3B provided the following Information. Utilizing a new engine
rebuilt with only aged combustion system parts and first stage nozzle
and turbine blades, the performance loss in terms of specific fuel con-
sumption was determined to be 1.5%. The effect of eroded blades alone
was determined to be 0-3% of the total and produced a 50 rpm decrease
in high rotor speed and an increase of 5 F in EGT. The rest of the
losses can be explained by turbine tip clearance changes and slight
changes in turbine area. Turbine tip clearance increases affect SFC
approximately 0.4% per 0.010 inches increase over minimum. Nominal
tip clearance is 0.062 to 0.089 inches with replacement required when
the clearance exceeds 0.100 inches of radial clearance. First stage
turbine clearances run to the high side can obviously produce 1.5% loss
in SFC by themselves. Modest changes in turbine area of the order of
1.3% (2 classes) can affect SFC by 0.6%. It should be further explained
that an increase of turbine tip clearance to the maximum causes a severe
loss in low pressure compressor stall margin. Referring to Section III and
figure 19 of this report, the effects of the loss of low pressure turbine
performance through aging are more important than other components. It
is unfortunate that this fact was not recognized at the time this work
was done. The effects of turbine efficiency appear to be far more power-
ful upon specific fuel consumption than are small changes in high pres-
sure compressor efficiency.
7. Performance Problems with the JT8D - A preliminary review of the per-
formance of fifteen JT8D engines after engine repair and reintroduction
. into service is provided below as an indication of the efforts that
were undertaken to understand engine performance. Fifteen engines were
compared to JT8D-7 Specific Operation Instruction performance levels.
It was assumed for this analysis that all engines had the one-piece
burners, air cooled HPT vanes and original D-7 HPC. For the newer
engines (653 and 654 series) reference was also made to their individual
final acceptance performance levels.
H2
As a diagnostic guide the following performance parameter shifts at constant
thrust were used to indicate the specific area of component performance loss.
(a) Fan O.D. - Low rotor speed increases with increased levels of Ps3,
Ps4 (%A Ps3fe % APs4) and N2.
(b) LPC (including I.D. of fan stages) - Ps3 and Ps4 decreases
(%A Ps3« % A Ps4) with a decreased level of N2 but no change
in Nl.
(c) HPC - Ps3 increases with an increased level of N2 but no change
in Nl or Ps4.
(d) Burner - No change in Nl, N2 or Ps3. Ps4 could increase or stay
the same.
(e) HPT vane bow - Ps4 decrease but no change in Nl, N2 or Ps3,
(f) HPT - Ps3 increase with a decreased level of N2 but no change in
Nl or Ps4.
(g) LPT - Ps3 decrease with an increased level of N2 but no change in
Nl or Ps4. i
Bleed leakage and reverser leakage were not considered, since tests were run
with bleed ports capped and a reference tailpipe. In general, shifts of less
than 1% in Ps3 and Ps4 or 50 rpm in Nl and N2 were considered insignificant.
Various combinations of the losses mentioned above can be assumed to explain
combination of parameter shifts. This analysis only considered fairly straight
forward effects and should not be considered as the only interpretation possible
from the data.
The parameter shifts are one type of guide but should be integrated into a com-
plete analysis involving observed condition of engine parts and previous engine
modifications as well.
Results
Engine
654708
654671
654376
653847
653696
653852
649699
649661
649278
649087
648989
Comments
N2 up 100 rpm relative to acceptance. If engine configura-
tion had not been modified too much, would be indicative of
a HPC problem. The current level of N2, however,was within
normal limits.
Performance levels satisfactory.
TSFC and EGT levels satisfactory. However, N2was up 100 rpm
relative to acceptance and the normal limits.
Nl up 120 rpm relative to acceptance. If engine configura-
tion had not been modified too much, would be indicative of
fan O.D. damage. The current level of Nl, however, was
within normal limits.
Ps3 up 3 to 4% relative to either acceptance or normal level.
Indicative of high spool damage (more than likely HPT).
Data was unrealistic.
N2 up 150 rpm relative to normal level. Indicative of a HPC
problem.
*
Nl up 100 rpm relative to normal level with corresponding
increases in Ps3 and Ps4. Indicative of fan O.D. damage.
Nl up 60 rpm and N2 up 130 rpm relative to normal level
with Ps3 and Ps4 increases corresponding to Nl increase.
Indicative of a combination of fan O.D. damage and HPC
problems.
No shifts in speeds or pressures. Indicative of a burner
section problem.
Nl up 100 rpm relative to normal level with no Ps3 or Ps4
change. Indicative of fan O.D. and LPC problems.
648978 Ps3 up 4% relative to normal level. N2 has slight tendency
to be low. Indicative of a HPT problem.
648852 No shifts in speed or pressures. Indicative of a burner
section problem.
648837 Nl down 80 rpm and N2 up 130 rpm relative to normal level.
Nl should be good for engine. N2 indicative of a HPC
problem.
648764 No shifts in speed or pressure. Indicative of a burner
section problem.
The TSFC increases noted agreed with the EGT increases indicating that the
shifts werereal and not just measurement problems.
No single component stood out as the reason for the TSFC and EGT increases.
A tabulation of the components mentioned in the analysis is shown below.
i Fan O.D. - 4 cases
ii LPC - 1 case
iii HPC - 4 cases
iv Burner - 3 cases
v HPT - 2 cases
The burner section (diffuser, fuel nozzles, burner cans, transition ducts,
etc.) have been a source of considerable performance deficiencies. There
is no shift in any performance parameter that can be used to detect most
cases of burner deficiency. Ideally, a combustion efficiency change would
only affect fuel flow and leave EGT unchanged. In practice, the deviation
that caused the efficiency change usually changes the burner temperature
pattern as well. A loss in combustion efficiency, therefore, could be
present in any of the twelve engines that indicated TSFC and EGT losses to
some degree.
9.% Causes and Unknowns Concerning the Loss of Performance Over Time -
There are obvious factors that effect the loss of engine performance versus
time of service use. The uncertainty lies in the amount of loss associated
with each factor and the cost of recovering the performance lost. New pro-
duction engine performance can be achieved if all of the worn parts are
restored or replaced to the original drawing tolerances and finishes. The
cost of such a repair philosophy has been more than the airlines have been
willing to pay. It is equally true that the continued usage of old parts
until they become unsafe for further service involves increased costs in
terms of fuel consumption losses heretofore only partially realized. The
science of obtaining performance from old parts has not been developed to the
degree required to do the cost benefit tradeoffs necessary to implement
another course of action. Progress has been made in determining the cost
of recovering performance and will continue to be made as time goes by.
However, the effects of parts aging should be taken into account in the
design process. It should be possible to design an engine such that the
majority of performance can be recovered inexpensively. The efforts of the
airlines to achieve recognition of this problem will be seen in the requirements
for performance guarantees that apply through the first four thousand hours of
operation. If original engine performance has to be achieved by very fine
des'ign details such as very accurate control of seal clearances, tip clear-
ances variable geometry rigging tolerances, area tolerances, etc. then the
original performance as delivered will not last. Airlines fly on used engines
and average engine performance. The objective in the original design
must be to achieve long life both in parts and in performance and to pro-
vide the repair and maintenance procedures that make the retention of per-
formance economical. Current problems are briefly summarized below.
a. Blade Erosion Effects on Flow Capacity and Efficiency - The effects
of blade erosion are more noticeable in the compressors and fans
than in turbine. The effects of erosion on stall margins have been
determined by experience and through experience the airlines have
normally wound up in a major campaign to reblade compressors on an
expedited basis. The sensitivity of engine stall margin to Inde-
pendent blade and vane conditions is an unknown. There are indications that
compressor stall margin is more sensitive to vane condition than blade
condition at least in the case of the JT3D high pressure compressor.
American is currently testing suspect JT8D engines for stall margin
because of the sensitivity of the JT8D to stall in the center position
of the Boeing 727. Engine selection criteria have been developed to
preclude a stall-sensitive engine from being installed in the center
position but sufficient data has not been developed to indicate how
the engine should be rebuilt economically to remove this constraint.
Rework of the fan component of the Spey engine gave strong indication
that engines were experiencing a loss of airflow capacity with age and
that recontouring and resurfacing the blades restored the compressor to
close to the original'capability.
b. Maintenance of Minimum Clearances
Maintaining minimum clearances in turbine seals is extremely effective
in retaining performance of current engines. The effects that JT8D
and JT3D compressor tip clearance have on efficiency and stall margin
have not yet been documented and remain an unknown to the majority
of airlines.
c. Foreign Object Damage
The current practice of blending nicks in blades caused by foreign
object damage is expected to continue. The larger fan blades for
high bypass ratio engines make the continuation of the practice neces-
sary as the per unit price per blade exceeds 1000 dollars. As ad-
vanced blading is employed such as multiple circular arc blading s
the effects of blending nicks on the aerodynamic performance are
expected to become more severe. Currently, decreased solidity of
up to 10% occurs locally as the result of heavy blending to recover
blades damaged by FOB. The absence of highly'accurate airflow meas-
uring capability has precluded much progress in defining performance
losses in this area.
d. Case Flange Seals
The higher pressure ratio engines produce case flange seals which are
difficult to maintain, particularly when engine parts are scrambled.
The amount of leakage that exists to date from this mixing of case
pieces of current engines is an unknown to American's knowledge.
No airline has taken the time to check for case seal leakage variations
from engine to engine.
e. Final Nozzle Area/Contours and Thrust Reversey Leakage
Current aircraft engine nozzles have no provisions for trimming the
final area. The criticality of local nozzle contours to overall
engine performance has not been defined and maintenance handbooks are
less than definitive on the allowable variation in contour, surface
roughness and out of round limits. Reverser seal designs and replacement
practices allow the discharge air to escape to ambient. While sea
level static testing can indicate oversized nozzles by trends in engine
operating characteristics the escape of high pressure air at the
beginning of the fan cowl boatail probably produces a drag penalty
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which exceeds the loss measured statically. It is the normal
practices to test engines with reference hardware and aircraft
nozzles and reversers are not installed for separate testing.
C. Cost of Performance
It is often tacitly assumed that an advancing technology produces improve-
ments in performance which are worth the purchase cost. In reviewing ad-
vanced engine cycles for an ATT type aircraft it is apparent that little
can be gained in terms of engine thrust-to-weight ratio and specific fuel
consumption benefits over the current generation of advanced high bypass
ratio engines. Further it is evident from internal airline studies that the
tools employed to evaluate the economic benefits of future aircraft and engines
are sufficiently vague that the tolerance for error is obscuring real trends.
It is equally important that there has been little if any assessment of what
benefits have been actually achieved from past investments in advanced engines.
This section of the report is directed at isolating engine costs within actual
fleets while showing not only trends but relationships with certain key param-
eters. From these relationships it is the further aim to present the value-
of historical achievements as well as give some insight to future engine re-
search objectives.
1. General Cost Relationships - The benefits of improved engine performance
have traditionally been assessed in terms of increased aircraft range or
payload. These benefits were specifically related to fuel consumption
and engine specific weight or that which can be termed technical advance-
ments. Based on estimated engine costs and aircraft utilization, pro-
jected aircraft direct operating costs (DOC) and return on investment
(ROI) are calculated for newly purchased or planned aircraft.
The number of assumptions made in calculating DOC & ROI are subject
to errors which are perhaps larger than the estimated performance im-
provements .
Procedures for roughly estimating engine production prices have been
previously discussed in the Section I. The procedures to estimate engine
maintenance cost developed by the ATA is described below and are taken
from ATA Standard Method of Estimating Comparative Direct Operating
Costs of Turbine Powered Aircraft of December 1967.
Labor — Engine (includes bare engine, engine fuel control, thrust reverser, exhaust nozzie systems, and
augmentor systems) (includes gear box, but does i;ot include propeller on turboprop
engines; (Figure 3)
KFH l( " KFCC = - § - a (R. )
t L'
b b
Where: KpH = (0.6 + 0.027 T/ 103) Ng = Labor manhours per flight hour (turbojet)
e
K „ = (0.65 + 0.03 T/103) N = Labor manhours per flight hour (turboprop)
F H 6
c
K = (0 3 + 0 OS T/!03) N = Labor manhours per flight cycle (jets and turboprop)FCo
T = Maximum certificated takeoff thrust, including augmentation where applicable and at
sea level, static, standard day conditions (Maximum takeoff equivalent shaft horsepower
at sea level, static, standard day conditions for turboprop).
RL = Labor rate per man-hour $4.00
N = Number of engines
Material — Engine (includes bare engine, engine fuel control, thrust reverser, exhaust nozzle systems and
augmentor systems) (includes gear box, but does not include propeller on turboprop engines)
fC t -i- P ^( CFH l! T CFC >
C = e fl
am
 v t
b b
Where: C
 f - 'J.5 N (C /1'J") ~ Material Coat - S/Flight Hour (For Subsonic Airplanes;
C = 2 0 N (C /I05) = Material Cost - $/Flight Cycle ;For Subsonic Airplanes)
F C « v e/
C = 4.2 N >'C /105) = Material Cost - $/Flight Hour (For Supersonic Airplanes)
F H e ' e/
C „ = 2.9 N (C /105) = Material Cost — S/Flight. Cycle (For Supersonic Airplanes)
N = Number of engines
C - Cost of cno engine
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The distribution of the elements in direct operating cost for the recently
entering service new technology aircraft can be compared at this point in
time with the older generation for a point of reference. The total direct
operating cost can be broken into pie segmented graphs and appear below for
both an old generation aircraft and a new aircraft type. Engine costs impact
the areas of depreciation, insurance, maintenance and fuel and oil. Although
not conclusive, because early cost data on the 747 does not show a decernible
trend, it appears that engines represent a larger portion of the maintenance
costs. The overall maintenance cost is a greater percentage of the total while
the fuel and oil represents a smaller segment when compared to the 707 aircraft.
More will be said about these major items later.
747
Depreciation
12.2%
Obsolete Parts
0.26%
Maintenance
22.4%
Flying Operations
65%
Taxes
707-300
Depreciation
8.3%
Obsolete Parts
0.7%
Maintenance
20.9%
Flying Operations
70.4%
Taxes
Figure 10 is a comparison of actual engine maintenance costs versus the
cost which would be calculated from the listed ATA equations and
shows the divergence of real cost versus ATA projected costs. Indicated
on the figure is the direction costs have taken with advancing technology.
The trend or relationship between projected and actual should be expected.
The elements of any forecast are dependent on fore-knowledge of technology
trends. It can .therefore be expected that as advancements in engines are
achieved the cost relationships will not necessarily follow. There is no
attempt here to change the ATA coefficients nor to criticize the methods
outlined. It is the purpose of Figure 10 to acknowledge that ATA cost
relationships should not be relied upon for cost projections.
Figures 11 & 12 show on a relative basis the actual maintenance, material
and labor, costs with reference to turbine inlet temperature without any ad-
justment for engine size, price, or flight cycle. Sufficient parts usage
experience with the highest temperature engine has not been obtained as of this
writing and a reduction in maintenance cost is anticipated. The straight
line suggests the probable relationship based on past experience and it is an
effort to estimate dampened maintenance cycle trends.
Figures 13 & 14 show an indication of current engine prices per pound of
thrust and per pound of weight. The cost of a pound of engine weight and
maintenance as related to thrust to weight (T/W) are covered in
Figures 15 and 16 respectively. While it is apparent that advanced technology
has permitted advancements in engine performance at essentially no change in
basic purchase costs per pound of thrust, in current dollars (also no reduc-
tion in cost per pound of thrust), the effects of technology on maintenance cost
have been quite profound. It should be pointed out that all referenced costs
relate to vehicles with approximately the same utilization.
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It is normal to expect as turbine temperatures increase so will compressor
pressure ratios. The effects that increasing high pressure compressor
pressure ratio have had on compressor maintenance material costs is depicted,
on a relative basis, in Figure 17.
As discussed in the preceding section engine performance deteriorates with
time. Maintenance practices have not recovered this loss in performance
so that over the years of use there has been a gradual accumulation of
SFC losses. The maintenance cost which have been shown here should be
considered as those costs necessary to maintain a mechanically
reliable engine which complies to all manufacturers requirements and
Federal regulations .pertaining to engine maintenance. The additional
costs and benefits of maintaining a minimum level of engine specific fuel
consumption performance loss have not been assessed nor can it be with
todays limited information. However it is obvious that if engine specific
fuel consumption were maintained close to the original production level an
increase in material and labor cost would accrue.
Historical maintenance costs variation for several engines are plotted
versus service time in years in Figure 18. The data for each engine have
been normalized on the basis of the first year cost.
Early costs tend to be high due to premature failures and "infant" mortality.
Large portions of these could be avoided or greatly reduced by operating
the engine at a reduced power setting during early introduction. This
management procedure also tends to reduce the demands for early spare engines
and the expenses associated with their purchase. Large portions of first year
expenses may fall within warranty coverage; Although the values shown reflect
actual expenses it must be remembered that warranty recovery credits are
included.
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FIGURE 10
ATA ESTIMATED MAINTENANCE COST
VERSUS
ACTUAL MAINTENANCE COST
(LABOR AND MATERIAL)
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w
I Note: Labor rate used inATA equation were 1971
rates and flight durations
were from the same time
period.
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FIGURE 11
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RELATIVE MAINTENANCE MATERIAL COSTS
VERSUS
TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE AT TAKEOFF
PROJECTED
o
/? a/
TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE °F
FIGURE 12
RELATIVE MAINTENANCE LABOR COSTS
VERSUS
TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE AT TAKEOFF
PROJECTED
TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE °F (10~2)
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FIGURE 18
RELATIVE MAINTENANCE COST VERSUS
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* 5 4 & 6
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During the second and third year the first round of disk and life limited
parts replacements occurs and unexpected low cycle fatigue problems cause
an increase in maintenance costs. The gradual improvement of the engine
. to further life through modification tend to reduce maintenance cost until
the next round of life limited assemblies has to be removed. Again the
capitalized modification costs are not included. Only those costs actually
expensed were reported. Inadequate development is seen in early expenses
for modification to achieve life.. The investment for life in the JT3D
has been estimated to be 10% of its purchase cost. The investment for
life in the JT8D was on the order of 30% of the first cost, the JT9D ap-
pears to require much the same level of investment to bring it to a standard
where adequate life is in hand.
2. Alternate Method of Evaluation - A way of looking at the Cost of Performance
is to proceed with a value added or cost performance benefit accrual from
technology advancements. To achieve this end, the operation costs of two
engines, significantly different in technological advancement, were com-
pared. The major costs were isolated into fuel, material, and depreciation
categories. Costs were compared for the same time period with cyclic
effects deflated. For representative cruise conditions the following normal-
ized costs are found,
Operating Costs $/Engine - Hour
Old Technology New Technology
Engine Engine *
Depreciation $ 11 $ 32
Fuel 70 115
Material 8 41
Total $ 89/Eng-Hr. $188/Eng-Hr.
*This engine has a 20% improvement in SFC reflected in the fuel cost.
Labor costs were eliminated from an initial comparison or relationship
between the two technologies. The labor rate influence at present is o.n-
a three to one basis. Since it is difficult to substantiate this trend,
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all comparisons were made with the less volatile cost elements as shown.
All of the costs listed are based on an average annual utilization for
actual fleets of aircraft. The new technology engine can be generally
described as a larger higher bypass type. The primary or major parameter
relating the two engines is thrust. Thrust ratings, in a simple ratio,
for both takeoff and cruise can be used as correlation factors. The
thrust ratios, as multiples of the Old Technology Engine (OTE) produce
expected or projected New Technology Engine (NTE) cost levels. These
projected cost levels are $192/Eng.Hr. and $215/Eng.Hr. based upon cruise
and takeoff ratios respectively. If the common "square/cube" rule is ap-
plied to material and depreciation, while the direct ratio of cruise
thrust is used for fuel, a $185/Eng.Hr. can be projected. Based on the
aforementioned ratios it can be concluded that a cost level projection
from OTE values fall in the neighborhood of from $185 to $192/Eng.Hr.
in the absence of labor costs. The costs for the Old Technology Engine and
new technology engine are therefore quite comparable.
The specific fuel consumption performance for the ATT engine is not projected
to be greatly improved over current high bypass ratio engines. The trend in
maintenance and purchase costs with increased technology, are such that very
little economic benefit from advanced technology engines can be foreseen un-
less significant effort is placed on controlling and hopefully reducing these
costs in the future.
3. Recommendations - The objectives for the future engines must be improved
economics which places greater emphasis on first cost and long term main-
tenance cost, while maintaining or improving performance consistent with
the major objectives of low noise and pollution. There is every indication
that the next round of "advanced technology" engine could cost more than
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the performance improvement would be worth unless significant attention
is given to the technology of lower cost, longer parts life and high
propulsion system reliability.
61
SECTION III
Technology Areas of Major Importance
A. Introduction
There are five major areas where the airlines feel that advanced research
efforts would prove most productive. These areas are composite materials,
advanced reverser systems, component development for long life, compressor
and fan stall, and advanced engine control systems. The following dis-
cussions are directed at explaining the needs and cost implications and ob-
jectives in the areas mentioned above and are specifically applicable to the
ATT aircraft. These discussions are factored into the description of the
optimum engine as are the discussions of Section I of this report.
B. Composite Materials
The airlines were quite excited by the proposed use of composite material
for the fan blades and early stages of the low pressure compressor of the
RB211 engine. The material promised many qualities that had the potential of
producing real benefits in terms of lower containment weight, lower secondary
damage from element failure, possibilities for field repair of minor damage,
better stall margin, lighter engine weight and lower engine cost.
1. Advantages - The projected advantages of using composites as proposed
were reduced weight due to the low density and high strength properties
of the material, and reduced cost due to virtual elimination of component
machining. On large fans a low-weight blade means a signficantly lighter
disk and blade containment structure. Additional reasons for preferring
the composite fan blade were:
a. Better engine handling could be achieved because the low
density and high strength of composites permitted a wide-
chord (low aspect ratio) fan blade design. Rig tests
indicated that such blades would have better surge margin
than the narrow-chord blades made necessary by the use of
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titanium. This higher surge margin gives an engine with
greater flexibility of acceleration and deceleration, and
which is less sensitive to engine inlet distortion.
t>. Because of its wide chord and greater stiffness the composite
fan blades do not need the mid-span shrouds that are required
on the narrow-chord titanium fan blade to prevent flutter. The
composite fan blade would avoid the loss of efficiency and
mechanical, production and maintenance problems associated with
mid-span shrouds.
c. Composites, particularly the carbon filament reinforced plastics,
have a high degree of internal damping. When subjected to
conditions which induce a resonant vibration, the composite
blade will vibrate at a much smaller amplitude than a titanium
blade and decay rate is higher when the excitation is removed.
d
- The composites did not suffer from sudden fatigue failures like
titanium and other metals. With an increasing number of stress
reversals a gradual reduction in frequency occurs, and this
characteristic enabled a simple reliable test to be used as a
means of assessing life of a blade during service. Scrapping
of blades due to life limits could be reduced.
e. The multi-filament structure of composites is near.to"fail-safe."
Failure of a fiber in the close-packed matrix results in the
transference of the load, which will be shared by the adjacent
whole fibers in the region of the break. Mechanical damage
such as may be caused by foreign objects would result in the load
following alternative paths, without giving rise to the high
local stress concentrations which lead to rapid fatigue failure
of a metal blade.
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f. The composite fan blades could be repaired to restore the aero-
dynamic form - important to maintain performance in a high by-
pass ratio engine. Erosion or minor ingestion damage to a
blade can be repaired in the field. Depot repairs appeared easier
and to require much less expensive equipment than for titanium
blades.
g. The projected price for. a composite blade would have been less
than a corresponding blade in titanium.
h. Lastly, if a portion of a composite blade becomes detached, the
fibrous nature of the material would cause far less damage to
the rest of the engine than a similar failure in a titanium
blade.
2. Unresolved Concerns - While there were many advantages to the composite
material proposed there were unresolved problems. The effects of erosion
both rain and grit, and impact from pebbles and large birds were the areas
of concern. Various forms of protective coatingswere investigated as
were the development of leading edge laminates and metalic coverings.
These approaches produced the majority of protection needed but failed to
provide the capability to withstand a large bird strike as required by the
certification requirements without essentially producing a solid metal
blade. The consequential adoption of a titanium blade was required. Blade
retention, another early concern, was satisfactorily resolved early in the
program,
3. Other Applications - The uses for composites which can be foreseen are in
static structural elements such as fan cases and associated fan ducts, fan
and low pressure compressor blading and in stator blades and exhaust
struts. Opportunities exist for reducing the weight of blade containment
provisions both due to lighter blade weight and from perhaps case winding
for high strength. Further possibilities for application are in the area
of disk burst protection through the application of composites wound
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around the disk to preclude or reduce the consequence of a disk fail-
ure. Composites are in use today for aerodynamic fairing and for
acoustic treatment, and expanded use in these areas is probable. Per-
haps -a more dramatic improvement is available from an investigation
of the use of composites for nacelle structures such as inlets and
cowlings, provided that the cost to produce such components are reason-
able. Pylon structure and skins offer additional areas for application
with the objective of reducing weight. Information about the use and
experience with boron filament reinforced plastics or aluminum is
scanty. This material offers similar but not all of the benefits pro-
jected for carbon filament based composites. The airlines concern over
erosion and foreign object damage effects upon such boron filament
materials, as well as repair procedures, must be resolved.
4. Recommendations - The chief objectives for the application of composites
in commercial engines in order of priority are;
a. Improved safety and reduction of the consequences of blade and
disk failure.
b. Lower cost for engine procurement and maintenance.
c. Lighter engine/propulsion system weight.
C. Imoroved Reversers Performance
Thrust reverser systems in use today are satisfactory in terms of converting
forward thrust into a rearward retarding force. Typically on four engine
aircraft the power on the outboard engines must be reduced during the early
portion of the landing roll to prevent surging due to hot gas ingestions;
and the inboard engines must be reduced later in the roll, typically no
lower than 60 knots to prevent foreign object damage and stall from re-
ingestion. The three and two engine powered aircraft also must reduce power
to avoid reingestion or foreign object damage between 60 and 80 knots.
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Reverser performance can be addressed in many ways and from different points
of view. Reverse thrust has not been used to establish aircraft landing
distances under the Federal Aviation Administration rules. However, in a
real sense the use of reversers to shorten landing distance and reduce run-
way occupancy time are important as are the improved stopping character-
istics in foul weather conditions. The real requirement for reversers are
the latter and there are real weight, cost, and maintenance implications
for the advantage of having a reverser.
1. Background on Reverser Design & Development - Reversers have been
traditionally designed and certified by the aircraft manufacturer.
There has been a few notable exceptions in that Pratt & Whitney designed
and provided a reverser for one of the DC-8 series of aircraft, and Rolls-
Royce for the Spey/BAC 1-11 to name two. The DC-8 reverser was heavy and
costly and caused Pratt & Whitney to decline any other such undertaking
up until the present. On the positive side however the reverser was quite
reliable and trouble free. The same cannot be said for many of the other
reversers produced for American manufactured aircraft. The best reverser
experience to date has been with the target reverser on the DC-9 and
American's experience with the Spey reverser designed by Rolls-Royce for
the BAG 1-H aircraft. Reverser performance is equated by the airlines
as cost to maintain a level of reliability with respect to reports of
discrepancies, premature removals and aircraft delays.
2. Requirements for Future Reversers - A firm requirement for improved
reverser performance in the traditional sense of higher effectiveness
does not appear justified for the ATT aircraft. The performance level
of current reverser designs under static test conditions are fairly
uniform (approximately 40 to 45%) while the actual installed reverser
performance recognized is subject to additional factors. Recirculation
and engine stall sensitivity have set the lower ground speed boundary at
60 knots or higher for discontinuing the use of reverse thrust. The
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effects of the fan and gas generator flow fields upon wing and flap
performance have also effected the actual installed performance of the
reverser system. Several factors are important for an ATT type air-
craft. The reverser design employed must be integrated into the
nozzle assemblies such that a light weight, low noise, low cost,
reliable design can be achieved. The design must not contain elements
which produce aircraft delays and premature removals as current designs
have done. A review of the impact of reversers on aircraft delays and
cost for maintenance is provided below as well as a review of 727
reverser problems during a 9 month period to provide emphasis to the
requirements stated above. The overall objectives for the performance
of a thrust reverser system for the ATT are as follows:
a. The noise levels at maximum reverse thrust shall not exceed
the sideline noise limits set for the aircraft under FAR-36.
b. The thrust reverser system shall provide the maximum practicable,
reverse thrust force level consistent with safe, efficient air-
craft operation, giving full consideration to the need to use
reverse thrust at low speed during wet or icy runway conditions
and the need for functional check of reverser while static.
c. Consideration shall be given to the use of reverse thrust or partial
reverse thrust for controlling aircraft speed and flight path during
two-segment approaches for reduced noise. (A tradeoff between the
aircraft flap and gear positions required for high angle of descent
approaches and the use of lower flap settings and modest reverse
thrusts should be made. Additionally the weight increase for quick
acting reverser controls and actuation systems including the change
in noise radiation pattern within reversers deployed should be studied.)
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d. The reverser system should not cost more than 90 dollars per pound
of weight and should have a maintenance cost of. less than 0.50
dollars per flight.
e. The reliability of the reverser should be such that the entire system
produces no more than 0.2 delays per 1000 aircraft departures.
3, Current Reverser Performance Trends - The performance (reliability) of
current reversers in operation in American's fleet can be listed in
terms of delays per 1000 departures. The Spey reverser has never been
a noticeable delay problem during its operation and the reliability has
been excellent. The Boeing 727 reverser currently produces about 10
departure delays per month for a rate of .6 per 1000 departures. The in-
troduction of modifications to this system has signficantly improved its
performance from that achieved in 1969 and early 1970 to the point where
the reverser is currently the 5th largest cause for aircraft delays.
(The 727 reverser is slightly more complex than the Spey reverser but less
complex than the 707 reverser.) The JT3D Boeing 707 reverser system (core
and fan reversers) produce an average of 16 delays per month for an average
rate of 1.8 delays per thousand departures and is ranked 4th highest cause
for aircraft departure delays. The Boeing 747 reverser currently causes an
average of 6 delays per month for an average rate of 5 delays per 1000
departures and normally ranks between first and 4th in the cause for aircraft
delays. The Boeing 747 reverser is the most complex and newest and its
mechanical reliability will be improved with time.
A review of the problems associated with the 727 reverser during the period
of July 1969 to April 1970 is summarized below to indicate the
types of problems encountered and the relative cost of maintenance.
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727 Reverser Operational Problems
A review of thrust reverser problems as denoted by Pilot Reports and Main-
tenance Reports for the period between 7-1-69 to 4-12-70 revealed the follow-
ing problems.
Problem
Unable to unreverse
Link Bolts Loose*
Actuator Fairing - Attach
screws missing
Position indicating light
"flickers or on in flight"**
Actuator Fairing Cracked
Broken Links
Deflector Door Damage
Reverser Rig Problem
Directional Valve Leaking
Total Number of Write-ups
Notes:
* Maintenance Reports
"Off-Set Jam-Nut Loose"
"Drive Link Jam-Nut Loose"
"Jam Nut Loose"
"Link Bearing Worn"
"Fwd Link Bolt" Support
Bracket Loose"
"Linkage Loose"
"Pivot Bolt Loose" f
"Deflector Door Attach
Nut Loose"
Qty.
218
164
137
67
48
45
11
9
1
700 - 2.5 per day
58
23
36
16
9
5
15
2
164
Comments by Maintenance Crews
All were pilot report and were
corrected by "cleaned and
lubed."
Fleet Base Check - 140 were re-
paired by "tightened loose nut."
All corrected by switch adjust-
ment or repairing wiring.
69
Notes (Cont*d):
** "Lite Out"
Loose or
Broken Wires **"Lite on in Flight"
On T/R Switch Switch Adjusted or Cleaned
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
Maintenance
2
2
4
2
3
2
3
3
2
1
1
25
Costs for 727 Reversers
1
4
4
5
6
2
7
5
1
5
2
42
During the calendar year of 1969, the following costs were charged
to the 727 (all types) thrust reversers.
Overhaul
Depot*
Field
Other
Total
1969 Calendar Year 727/023 and 223: ATA 78
Material Labor Other
$330,000 $434,000
$ 33,000
$363,000
Total
$764,000
$ 30,000
60,000
4,000
$528,000
$ 2,000
21,000
$ 6,000
36,000
$54,000
$150,000
$ 42,000
$956,000
Unscheduled Costs
Scheduled Costs
$145,000
811,000
Total $956,000 or $3.97/aircraft hour
or $1.45/engine/landing
*Based on 300 shop visits
Note: Replacement of reverser parts is often entirely due to wear
induced by engine vibration of the reverser in the stowed
position.
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Because of these trends towards higher delays with increasing complexity
and the impact that such delays have on aircraft productivity the air-
lines tend to place heavy emphasis on simplicity. On a relative basis
related to the highly reliable Spey reverser, the current cost of
JT8D reverser maintenance is more expensive by a factor of 3, the JT3D
a factor of 4 and the JT9D a factor of 12. The JT9D reverser is of
course suffering normal early problems, nonetheless a factor of 8 in
cost is probably representative for the future.
The design concept for the ATT should approach the simplicity of the
Convair 990 and DC-9 target reversers. As a last item current reversers
are subject to leakage from internal seals which could have serious ad-
verse affects on nacelle drag. Other design requirements beyond those
objectives mentioned earlier are described below.
D. General Design Requirements for Future Reverser-Nozzle Systems
1. Exhaust Nozzles - Nozzle shall be made of corrosion resistant alloys.
The exhaust nozzles shall be designed to easily accommodate modest
changes in exit areas by trimming, tabbing or extending the exit cone.
2. Noise Suppression Treatment - The exhaust and thrust reverser systems
shall be acoustically treated to provide an appropriate portion of the
overall, installed engine noise suppression requirement including sup-
pression of the noise in reverse thrust.
3. Thrust Reverser System
a. The reverser system may be two positional, without modulation except
by adjustment of the engine thrust setting.
b. The system shall be designed to minimize thrust loss and/or specific
fuel consumption increase with the reversers in the forward thrust
position and shall not cause engine surge, flameout, overspeed, or
engine operating condition outside the engine limits while in any
position from fully stowed to fully deployed.
71 '•
c. Actuation time for the reverser system shall not exceed 2.0 seconds
in either direction.
d
- As installed on the airplane, the thrust reverser system must provide
the maximum deceleration force to the airplane taking into account changes
to the airplane drag due to reverser operation. In addition the
reverser operation must not cause serious deterioration of airplane
control.
e
- The reverser effectiveness should be as a minimum 40% of engines gross
thrust at sea level static conditions.
£• The reverse effectiveness performance must be maintained at speeds from 120
knots down to 60 knots at maximum continuous power. From 60 knots to
static condition the reverser will be left deployed to supply as much
additional braking impulse as possible. The contractor will specify
the levels of reverse effectiveness and power achievable over this lower
speed range without causing flame-out or damage to the engine.
g. Blockers will be required in the reverser system to limit exhaust air
impingement on the ground for the wing mounted installation and on the
control surfaces for the aft mounted installation. The blocking or
redirectional devices must be easily removable and replaceable for
Quick Engine Change (QEC) buildup of either wing or tail mounted pods.
h. Normal operation of the thrust reverser system for ground braking shall
not result in significant loss of aircraft directional control.
i. The reverser system shall be so constructed that if accidentally deployed
at maximum cruise speed or if already deployed and speed is increased to
the maximum design dive speed, no serious damage shall occur, after which
it shall be capable of being stowed when speed is reduced to 200 knots.
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j. The system shall be designed such that no single failure shall result in
unintentional operation of the system.
k. Thrust reverser system position indication shall be provided. The system
shall provide a signal to energize a light when in reverse and a similar
and separate signal showing the reverser is not stowed or in transit. All
light(s) shall be out when the reverser system is stowed and latched in
the forward thrust position.
1- Means shall be provided to secure the reverser and spoiler in the stowed
position, both by use of mechanical latches and by over-centering of the
actuating linkages. The latches shall not be affected by failure (false
signal, etc.) of the hydraulic or pneumatic selector valves or their
operation mechanisms.
m. A means shall also be provided for securing the reverser system in a
fixed position for safety of ground personnel during maintenance.
n. Means shall be provided for securing an inoperative reverser in the
stowed position while airplane is on the ground to permit dispatch with the
reverser inoperative. Means shall be provided for inspection of the
"stowed" position of the latches and over-center linkages. The latch
inspection means shall be readily visible.
o. The system shall be designed so that, in the event of loss of motive
force, the reverser will:
While in the reverse position - remain in reverse position
While in the forward thrust position - remain in that
position
P- The system shall be designed with maximum freedom from asymmetric
operation. Where failure can cause asymmetric conditions, the system
(including engine mounts) shall be designed to accommodate the re-
sultant loads.
q. An interlock shall be provided in the reverser control system to limit
application of thrust to approximately reverse idle until the reverser
is in the reverse position.
r. Ground functional check provisions shall permit operation of reverser
without engine operation.
4. Reverser' System Control
a. The system on each engine shall be completely independent of the system
on other engines for normal operation.
b. The system shall be directly controlled by the engine power lever. The
motive power for operation of the system shall be independent of the
airplane hydraulic and/or pneumatic systems. Actuation of the system
shall not be dependent upon application of the engine power.
c- The system must be designed to provide maximum simplicity. For proper
operation every effort shall be made to avoid the need for sequencing
mechanisms in the control system.
d. All components required for actuation of the reverser system, e.g.,
actuators, valves and accumulators, shall be supplied by a single con-
tractor whether or not installed in the nacelle. This does not apply
to piping and support bracketry for components installed in the air-
frame .
e. The system shall include the incorporation of feed-back of position
into the control system, which will prevent inadvertent movement of
the engine power lever beyond the minimum reverse thrust position unless
the reverser buckets are in the reverse thrust position. In addition,
if while in reverse thrust the buckets can inadvertently open to forward
thrust position, this feedback system or "throttle" interlock shall
return the engine thrust level to .idle detent thrust.
D. Advantages & Disadvantages of High Performance Components
Engine performance improvements other than those achieved by basic changes
to engine cycle characteristics must be derived from performance improve-
ments in component state-of-the-art. Higher stage loadings and work factors,
high efficiency levels and annulus flow rates are the traditional approaches
to achieving lighter weight, higher performance engines. These improvements
have produced the high technology engines of today which have provided im-
provements in aircraft range and payload. In every visible respect all of
these improvements have been worthwhile, however, they have been achieved
at a price. Continued pursuit of the traditional path for component re-
search is worthwhile but an additional dimension should be considered. This
dimension for lack of a better word is realism. From the following review
there are indications that as technology has improved the sensitivity of
component performance to small changes in mechanical condition has increased,
and further the dependence of the overall engines performance on retaining
the high efficiency of each components has equally increased. The loss of
1% in compressor efficiency has a modest effect on a JT3D and a more serious
effect on the JT9D. The effects of blade tip clearances on the JT3D do not
appear to be as signficant as they are on high bypass engines.
The majority, if not all, of component performance development done by manu-
facturers and government agencies is undertaken using new parts and is con-
ducted over a relatively short period of actual component running time.
Historically there has been little information obtained on the effects of var-
iation in blade surface condition, variation in blade leading and trailing
edge contours and variation in blade tip or seal clearances. The experience
that is gained in the development process is normally only recorded for use
on a temporary basis to determine the course of action for subsequent testing
to improve component performance.
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The efficiency of every component is affected by clearances, contours,
leakages, and surface conditions and the ability to maintain these mechanical
conditions is not adequately considered in the design process. There are
practical constraints to the ability of even a sophisticated repair facility
to maintain shapes, fits and clearances to higher standards than currently
employed. The costs for maintaining improved levels of contour, fit and
tolerance control have never been assessed. The costs of not maintaining
such control is apparent in the more rapid deterioration of higher per-
formance engines. It is apparent that each new technology component is re-
quiring a level of control greater than its predecessor and this control may
not be achievable in practice.
1. Influence/Fault Coefficients - The airlines have used influence/fault
coefficients as an aid to determine the cause of measured performance
changes in both in-service and overhauled engines. Influence coefficients
are determined by artifically changing a component performance parameter
by one percent and calculating the effects of such a change on other com-
ponents measured performance parameters (i.e. a change in the low pres-
sure efficiency by one percent changes the fuel flow, exhaust gas tempera-
ture, rotor speeds, pressure ratios, etc.). Influence coefficients are
helpful in understanding the relative importance that each component
parameter plays in the overall performance of an engine. There are several
factors however that are important and have hampered the usefulness of in-
fluence coefficient for determining the source of performance deterioration.
a. The first factor is that rarely has a single component caused the
shift in performance measured. Normally several components are re-
sponsible and the influence of one component masks or distorts the
effects of another. To provide a basis to.distinguish the component
or component most probably responsible for the major portion of the shift
in performance, a computer program has been utilized which identifies
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the most likely component in descending order of probability. Additional
techniques are currently being developed to iterate the performance, using a
computer model, of an average production engine until the performance
duplicates the actual engine under test. By comparing the production
standard versus the data for the.engine under test a complete analysis of the
loeation(s) of the deficiencies can be established at the major component
level.
b. The second factor that prevents full utilization of these techniques is
even though the problem components may have been identified, there is little
information on what must be done to restore the performance. To under-
take restoring the component's performance the sensitivity to roughness,
clearance, shapes, etc. individually and in combination needs to be
understood. Lacking this information,economical repairs have been
identified only by trial and error. The replacement of worn parts
with an all new component or parts is too expensive to be warranted
except in the case of engine stall.
c. Lastly the ability to instrument engines beyond the level of instru-
mentation normally required for engine operation is extremely difficult.
Access ports for pressure and temperature instrumentation have not
been provided until the most recent high bypass engines. The per-
formance improvements achieved by a given rework to a specific com-
ponent are therefore difficult to assess
2. Changes in Influence/Fault Coefficients with Advancing Technology - Figures
19 through23 are the influence/fault coefficients for current engines. A
complete review of these figures will not be presented but characteristic
trends with changes in technology are discussed which are pertinent to re-
search on advanced components.
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Fault Coefficients at T.O. Power
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Figure 20
Fault Coefficients at T.O. Power
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Figure 21
Fault Coefficients at T.O. Power
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Figure 22
Fault Coefficients at T.O. Power
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Figure 23
Fault Coefficients at T.O. Power
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a. Fan efficiency loss is not relatively as important in terms of
advanced engine performance as are other components. Stall sensi-
tivity and airflow retention are however extremely important. The
effects of leading edge shape and surface roughness on fan airflow
have not been documented. The performance of advanced blading of
the multiple circular arc design after erosion by normal use and the
effects of leading edge removal of up to 0.5 inches of the chord must
be assessed. The performance of the fan in terms of noise may also
be affected by normal deterioration and maintenance practices. It
can be assumed that for large fan engines of the future fan efficiency
retention will not be relatively more important than it is today.
b. Low pressure compressor performance has considerably more impact on
the overall engine performance of early turbofan engines than of the
new high bypass types. What is significant is the fact that low
compressors are easier to remove and maintain than high compressors.
It is assumed that low compressor blade tip clearances have little
effect on flow capacity or efficiency and that surface roughness is
equally less important in the newer engines. The effect of increased
tip clearances and surface roughness on low pressure compressor stall
margins is probably small; however, the importance of L.P. compressor
condition on H.P. compressor stall margin performance is unknown.
The knowledge about these factors is unsatisfactory.
c. As technology has progressed the pressure ratio of high pressure com-
pressor components has been increased while maintaining a high -level
of efficiency. To accomplish these advances improved blading and
variable vanes have been employed as well as closer control of seal
and tip clearances, leakages and secondary flow. The sizes of air-
foils have decreased slightly and there are more noticeable Reynolds No.
effects on overall performance. The effects of the loss of high
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pressure compressor efficiency is becoming more pronounced in
terms of overall engine performance. Clearance limits on older
high compressor blades nominally run plus or minus .010 inches
(.060 to .080) and replacement limits .015 inches greater clear-
ance than the largest tolerance value (.095). On newer engines
however the effect of a change of .010 inches in tip clearance
can cost 1% in efficiency and 1% in specific fuel consumption and
serious loss of stall margin; Economic means to recover high
pressure compressor blades from serious effects of erosion have not
been developed. The high pressure compressor for the future engines
will be targeted for a minimum of 907» polytropic stage efficiency.
Therefore great care must be exercised in the design of advanced
compressors, and increases in efficiency and pressure ratio beyond
those levels in use today should not be undertaken without a better
understanding of the ability to economically maintain the performance
achieved. The effects of usage on high compressor stall margin is
causing considerable concern today particularly for the more modern
engine.
d. The presence of a loss of combustor efficiency or change in pressure
drop are extremely difficult to determine. The combustor chamber
pressure drop has been increased on several engines from when delivered
by modifications to improve burner durability. The main effect dis-
covered to date concerning combustor deterioration has been shifts in
temperature profile. These shifts can affect blade life and gives an
artificial indication of loss of SFC However, knowing what to do
about the condition is something entirely different, as is knowing
precisely what design or mechanical feature is causing the loss.
e. Just as wttli compressors the bladlng of turbines change due to erosion,
corrosion and contamination during operation too. There are three pre-
dominant causes for performance loss surface roughness, loss of seal clear-
ances and changes in turbine blade tip clearances. The relative importance
of HP turbine efficiency increases with pressure ratio and technology.
The method of re-introducing cooling air into the main stream is also
extremely important. The effects of first turbine blade erosion on the
JT3D has been measured at 0.3% increase in SFC. The effects of .031
increase in tip clearance was a 1 .27» increase in SFC or roughly .470
per 0.10 inches. The effects of first turbine blade roughness on the
high bypass engines have not been determined but the effect of a .010
inches increase in tip clearance is nominally a 0.7% loss of SFC and
a similar, loss in low pressure compressor stall margin. *
O T
The effects of seal clearance deterioration depends obviously on the
increased flow rate through the seal and where the flow goes. The
smaller the seal diameter the less sensitive it is in terms of overall
performance. High pressure seal clearance control in the HP turbine area
however have the greatest effects on performance.
3. Conclusion - In summary as components and engines have been improved the
performance rffects of small differences in mechanical condition have in-
creased. There is little advantage to advanced components if there per-
f)
formance cannot be maintained at a realistic cost. There has been a
general lack of definitive data provided in the entire area of per-
formance retention such that the airlines have had to develop much of
the data in use today. This situation is not expected to improve unless
serious research is undertaken into the effects of aging. The only
recourse available to the airlines at the moment is to insist that the
technology programs for the future contain the requirement to determine
the effects of aging and to require engine manufacturers to guarantee the
performance of their product to be good for extended periods, such as
4000 hours. The ATT engine could have higher pressure ratios, higher
temperatures, etc. but if the performance degrades rapidly or depends
on non-maintainable design features of what value are the advances? It
would certainly be an improvement if the most sensitive components were
the most accessible components. A highly critical high compressor is
the way to economic disaster for the airlines.
E. Cost Impact of Compressor Stall Sensitivity
Compressor and fan flow instability with distortion is a prime example of an
area of technology that requires additional effort. Many military engine
programs and commercial engine programs have had significant delays or in-
creased development costs solely attributable to compressor stall. The in-
troduction of the Boeing 747 was marred by three incidents of engine stall at
idle power during the first few days of service. Only a brief review of the
costs of engine stall on a series of commercial engines is included below. The
requirement for any new engine for commercial aircraft is that it shall not
stall (unless the engine has experienced a failure). Engine manufacturers
must guarantee that the engine as installed will not stall during any opera-
ting mode of the aircraft whether normal or abnormal. Engine stall is too ex-
pensive to be tolerated.
1. JT3D - In 1965, American Airlines experienced an off-idle stall problem
that was considered associated with deteriorated high compressor blades
which had an average total operating time of 12,000 hours. At that time,
most of the engines involved were of the 9th stage bleed configuration,
and the only known way to regain stall margin was to buy new compressor
blades. This was done at a cost of $1.14 million. The 9th stage bleed
configuration stall margin did improve, but not enough. In 1967, P&W
offered a further improvement in off-idle stall margin with a 12th stage
bleed configuration. American Airlines elected to incorporate the Mod
at a cost of $2.68 million. This has virtually eliminated the off-idle
stall problem.
However, another type of stall is being encountered today - high altitude
decel stall. This problem results from the opening up of first stage
nozzle guide vane area as time between major repair on turbines is in-
creased. The increased area cause the high compressor to slow down and
the low compressor to speed up. During a decel, the Nl maintains a
higher speed longer due to its greater mass. When the mismatch is great
enough, the stall occurs. On the average, eighteen engines are removed
for this cause each year and the test cell performance program rejects an
additional 12/year which would stall when put on an aircraft. This re-
sults in an annual cost to American Airlines of $170,000.
2. JT8D - The major stall problem on the JT8D occurs at high power and par-
ticularly in the No. 2 position on the 727 aircraft. The average time on
the engines is approximately 10,000 hours, during which a significant amount
of hardware deterioration has taken place resulting in reduced stall
margin. On the average, two engines a month are removed for this cause
with a cost impact estimated to be $43,800/year. The cost impact would be
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much higher except it is known that an engine that stalls in the No. 2
position will operate satisfactorily in a No. 1 or 3 position. A
computer program has been developed which predicts those engines that
would stall in the No. 2 position so those engines are restricted to an
outboard position. Based on January production, American could expect
an additional 4 engine removals per month if this program was not in
effect. This would bring the annual cost to $131,000/year.
As of this time the airlines do not know where to spend their money to
recover the stall margin. However, American is currently accomplishing
a series of "Bills-of-Work" to an engine out of which it is hoped can
be determined the action required. The testing program will cost roughly
$50,000.
3. JT9D - The JT9D has a basic compressor instability problem with suscept-
ibility to stall in crosswind conditions and reversing operations. There
is also a long history of inflight flame outs. Costs attributable to
these problems have reached $1.5-2.0 million since beginning of AA opera-
tion. These costs are based on the average repair cost of engines re-
moved for stall and overtetnp. It is estimated that an additional $1.3
million will be required for upgrade modifications to finally correct
the problem. However, the effects of erosion and deterioration in general
remain unknowns. The costs borne to date or planned represent in excess
of 5% of the total price paid for all of the JT9D engines American procured .
4. Conclusions - It is probable that if all American's records were reviewed
that engine stall has c_ost American in excess of 8 million dollars. The
cost to the U.S. airlines for engine stall is reasonably estimated to be
in the neighborhood of 80 million dollars. Several factors should be
considered as goals for future engines.
a. A complete understanding of the effects of erosion on compressor blading
and stall margin needs to be achieved.
b. Economical means for the recovery of compressor stall margin must
be developed as well as general performance recovery maintenance
procedures and practices.
c. Design guidelines must be developed which provide the compressor
designer with information which will permit a new design to
be compatible with a and b above.
d. Compressor instability under normal operating procedures during
early introduction of an aircraft must not be allowed.
F. Basic Requirements for an Advanced Technology Transport Aircraft Engine Control
System
The complexity of engine fuel control systems have increased markedly with the
passage of time. The introduction of high bypass ratio engines have added
further complexities not only to the control system but in terms of engine
rating systems and power management procedures. The desire for auto-throttle
systems for use with advanced autoland systems has added additional require-
ments which cannot be optimumly accomplished with current or projected hydro-
mechanical controls. The poorer acceleration characteristics of high bypass
engines have required multiple idle settings, and altitude deceleration stall
S
characteristics as well as avoidance of thermal shock during deceleration '->
have required additional fuel scheduling features. These complexities
when added to the higher thrust lapse rates of high bypass engines have
produced thrust setting procedures which require significantly higher work-
loads for the crew. To avoid the constant referral to tables or hand held
calculators the development of TAD-EPR computers which displays the proper
power setting value was undertaken and these computers are in use.
Perhaps the largest single problem with current controls is associated with
the inability to compensate for non-standard altitude - temperature lapse
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rates particularly during climb. Because high bypass engines have a higher
altitude and speed thrust lapse rate the aircraft becomes climb thrust
critical. The inability of the control to independently correct and main-
tain the proper thrust level with differences in temperature lapse rate
requires a re-adjustment of climb power every few thousand feet during climb.
Very often it is possible to over boost the engine during climb due to rapid
changes in speed, temperature lapse rate etc. As a result of these current
control limitations an additional annual cost on the order of 1/2 to 1 per-
cent for fuel and an estimated 25 to 337o for engine material parts cost has
already been encountered. The airlines requirement for the ATT engine is for
an advanced control beyond the capabilities of current hydromechanical controls.
1. Objectives for Engine Controls Systems - It should be possible for the
pilot to establish a given power setting and have the engine control
system maintain that setting regardless of aircraft speed, altitude, or
attitude. In addition, the engine control system should be capable of
providing sufficient engine fuel to meet all engine design and operation
criteria, i.e., start, accelerate, decelerate, and shut down,without in-
curring unnecessary engine hardware distress or operating malfunction.
To achieve this control, the fuel control system needs several of the
following signal inputs:
a. All Engine Rotor Speeds
b. Ambient Air Pressure and Temperature
c. Core Engine Compressor Discharge Pressures
d. Engine Pressure Ratio
e. Core Engine Discharge Pressure (P^ ,)
f. Core Engine Turbine Inlet or Exhaust Gas Temperature
g. Power Lever Position Input
The preferred basic signal reference for the control system would be core
engine speed modulated by the other parameters to achieve the constant
speed requirements at each preselected power lever position.
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To achieve the desired accuracy of speed control necessary to permit
uniform and symmetrical thrust, maximum fuel economy and maximum engine
parts utilization, it is essential engine speeds be controlled accurately
and synchronized to within + 0.2% between engines and to within + 0.2%
of the set parameter. This is not feasible with current hydromechanical
fuel controls and it is necessary to add on such items as auto-throttle
computing system at approximately $45,000/aircraft and an automatic engine
trim system at $30,000/aircraft.
2. Design Requirement - The ideal engine control system should contain the
following features:
a. Central Computer
1) An automatic thrust rating computer system incorporating the
ability to preset, select and maintain a selected number of
power control modes (takeoff, maximum climb, maximum cruise as
a minimum).
2) The ability to select, synchronize and maintain all engines
to within + 0.27=, of the selected thrust setting parameter
(Nl for large bypass fan engine; EPR or equivalent for pure
jet engines) regardless of aircraft speed, altitude or attitude.
3) The provision/capability to maintain constant aircraft speed as the
prime parameter.
b. Engine Control
In addition to the normal control functions the following should
be provided.
1) The engine control system should have the ability to automatically
trim individual engines + 5% to achieve the desired power setting.
Outside of this range, the system should incorporate a failure
warning device to indicate engine control system malfunction.
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2) The engine control system should be designed such that air is
easily purged from the system without the use of additional
systems or components. The introduction of air into the system
should be precluded except as a result of fuel tanks either
becoming depleted of fuel or the opening of a fuel supply line.
3) The engine control system should be packaged as a modular
assembly permitting either the changing and checkout of the
total system or any specific major module, i.e., pump, fuel
control, electronic control package, etc. In addition, any
portion of the engine control system shall be readily accessible
with the engine cowls open and component or system change times
a
of not more than 1 hour duration shall be easily accomplished.
4) The engine control system should incorporate a separately manually
operated fuel cut-off device or system between the control func-
tion and the fuel distribution manifold.
c. Reliability
Reliability goals for the control system should not be less than
30,000 hours MTBF*and 25,000 hours MTBURt* In addition, the reliability
of the system should not rely on such items as critical torque settings
for electrical connectors, etc.
d. Self Test
The correct functioning of any portion of the electronic system shall
be capable of either being checked out using built-in test equipment
or pre-programmed ground support test equipment.
* Mean time between failure
**Mean time between unscheduled removal
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SECTION IV
Evaluation of Phase I Advanced Transport*
Technology Engine Study Contractor Reports
The following recommendations and conclusions are based on an assessment of
the oral and written reports presented by General Electric and Pratt & Whitney
in accordance with Contract NAS3-15544 and NAS3-15550 respectively. A critique
of both contractors reports is provided in detail in subsequent paragraphs of
this report. The first section is addressed to the general conclusions and recom-
mendations which are drawn from both reports. The criticisms included herein are
intended to provide an airline perspective on the requirements for future power
plants.
GENERAL REVIEW & RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Cycle Studies
A. Both contractors exercised the required range of cycle variables to
insure a good first approximation of the optimum engine for both a
domestic and international range Mach No. 0.98 aircraft. Their assump-
tions concerning installation effects were identical with similar factors
being excluded from these early studies. The optimum engine of both
contractors lay between 4 and 5 in bypass ratio with nominal pressure
ratios between 25 and 30 with a modest increase in turbine inlet
temperature over the level that is in operation today in the advanced
high bypass ratio engines. An independent assessment using in-house
parametric data confirms these selections. The domestic range aircraft
favors the lower bypass ratio mentioned above and the
international aircraft the higher bypass ratio. A near optimum for
both aircraft would center at a bypass ratio of 4.5 with essentially
*This reflects the previous submittal format.
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neglible penalty to either aircraft. The effects of increased engine
bleed due to the demands for better isolation of smoking and non-
smoking passengers has been taken into consideration in this analysis
where it was not specifically covered in the contractors studies.
B The contractors made different assumptions concerning the aerodynamic
requirements for the nacelle and the flow conditions desired at the
U
mixing plane for mixed flow engines. The subsequent division in the
opinions of the two contractors are based on the differences brought
about by these assumptions. Neither contractor provided supporting
data for these assumptions and it should be recognized that, particularly
with respect to nacelle aerodynamics,very little data exists upon which
to make firm conclusions. The proper afterbody shape for mixed and non-
mixed flow engines for the Mach No. 0.9 to 0.98 speed region is in need
of a thorough wind tunnel test program with powered models. Secondly,
the effects of single and two stream engine nozzle configurations on
aircraft noise is not well understood and data from existing aircraft
indicates that there are effects that can be significant in efforts to
reach the target noise levels desired for future aircraft. The noise
impact of various nozzle configurations must be determined by test as the
effects can only be estimated today.
C. The preliminary installation configuration drawings of both contractors
indicated that aircraft and engine accessories would be driven from a
core mounted gearbox. This configuration is totally unacceptable to the
airlines as it hampers maintenance and helps to defeat the objectives of
modular engine construction. The labor to dress and strip the installa-
tion and accessory assemblies from a similarly configured engine is a
large percentage of the maintenance costs and totally defeats the ob-
jective of rapid fault isolation and repair.
The aerodynamic impact and costs for other accessory installation
schemes must be considered. Until such time as data is provided that
proves that core mounting is necessary it should be avoided.
D. The weight and performance benefits associated with composites are
significant and were recommended for use in fan blades and related,
assemblies. In addition to the weight and performance benefits the
airlines see great potential for decreasing the danger associated
with fan blade failure and a reduction in the seriousness of down-
stream secondary damage. It should be pointed out that a previous
program ran into difficulty with ingestion of large birds which are
part of the certification requirements. Clearly additional research
is warranted in this promising area.
E. The contractors reports did not include information pertinent to in-
vestigation of the effects of variable bypass ratio features, variable
geometry turbines or the effects of variations in engine rating schemes
or engine control features. These studies need to be undertaken to
determine the potential vehicle performance improvements possible from
such features.
F. The contractors economic studies are first order and are not sufficiently
definitive to produce more than general guidance. Maintenance cost is
not a simple function of thrust size and initial price nor are the
manufacturer's price estimating procedures sufficiently accurate for
determination of more than general trends as discussed in Section II
of this report. These shortcomings present perhaps one of the greatest
challenges in determining where research can be most effective. The
profit motive of the airlines puts great emphasis on lower first cost
and low continuing cost for maintenance.
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Opportunities exist for improving both with the application of tech-
nology to reduce the total propulsion system cost. The general
trends produced by the contractors are believed reasonable with
respect to the effects of various levels of noise treatment but with
the range of tolerances expected are not sufficiently accurate to deter-
mine a preference for mixed flow versus non-mixed flow or for the
selection of cycle characteristics within + 0.5 in bypass ratio,
+2.5 in cycle pressure ratio or + 100 F in turbine inlet temperature.
II. Noise
A. Results of fan component noise tests have not yielded sufficient evi-
dence to warrant a single approach to fan design. Instinctively the
airlines lean toward low tip speed single stage fans. However, single
stage high and low tip speed and low tip speed widely spaced two stage fans
should be considered in research programs.
B. It is noted that the results of the two contractors studies were quite
similar when the 5 EPNdB lower source noise assumption of GE's is ex-
cluded. Pratt & Whitney's interest in aircraft noise abatement opera-
ting procedures, to reduce the noise levels to below FAR 36-10 EPNdB,
is due to their reluctance to make a similar assumption. The GE study
however shows the importance of a 5 EPNdB fan noise source reduction in
achieving the low noise levels desired. The approach noise level goal
is the most difficult to reach. A re-assessment of the noise objectives
using footprints will show that takeoff noise dominates the largest
amount of land area.
C. It is important that the effects of various noise abatement operating
procedures be assessed as well as the effects the utilization, of such
procedures have on the optimum engine. Further it is recommended that
noise footprints be used to assess the overall benefits around the air-
port and the relative importance of reducing takeoff, sideline and ap-
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proach noise levels individually.
D. Neither of the contractors assessed the performance impact of inlet
splitters or variations in design approaches to inlet splitters, or
variations in design approaches to inlet noise suppression. It is
recommended "that effort be expended in this area. Further the effects
of various nozzle configurations, exhaust stream velocity ratios and
thrust reveirser designs should be studied for information as to the
best integrated design approach.
E. The sideline noise levels during thrust reversal and approaches to
acoustically treating the reverser system should be studied.
III. Pollution
A. It is suggested that the study contractors review the Environmental
Protection Agency's rules governing aircraft emissions and determine
what effects the rules will have on engine design or cycle character-
istics. At the current time these rules are four months behind schedule
and there release is indefinite. This recommendation however might be
carried out in subsequent efforts.
B. The suggestion by Pratt & Whitney that a high idle thrust level be
used as part of the solution to the idle emission problem is un-
satisfactory. The higher jet velocity and large air mass from these
engines present serious safety problems in the terminal area.
C. It was noted that Pratt & Whitney used an estimated relationship between
carbon monoxide-(CO) and hydrocarbon (HC) emission levels at idle of
4 parts CO to 1 part HC using CH4 as the basis for quoting levels.
General Electric utilized a generalized curve of CO and HC versus
combustion efficiency using 05^ 4 as the base for reporting hydrocarbon
emission' levels. More authoritative data and uniformity in reporting
would be helpful in assessing the difficulties in achieving the target
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pollution emission levels.
D. The use of water injection to reduce NOx emission is not viewed
favorably. This approach does not correct the emission into the
upper atmosphere and hence a design solution that produces reduc-
tions throughout the operation of the aircraft is needed.
IV. Summary
The major areas requiring additional study are summarized below for NASA's
consideration.
A. The impact of nacelle aerodynamics on engine cycle selection and mixed
versus non-mixed flow configuration needs to be defined.
B. The noise reductions achieved should be assessed by the use of noise
footprints as well as FAR 36 procedures.
C. The contractors should evaluate the impact of using noise abatement
operating procedures on the choice of an optimum engine.
D. Engine economic trends in terms of first cost and maintenance cost with
increasing cycle pressure ratio, temperature, etc. should be assessed
to determine points of emphasis for future research. Additional approaches
to assessing the economics of the various engine configurations is re-
quired.
E. Alternate accessory gearbox configurations should be studied to improve
accessibility and maintainability.
F. Variations of bleed air and horsepower extraction requirements including
anti-icing of inlet splitters should be examined for their influence on
optimum engine selection.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This report presents an airline's view of the significant design and installa-
tion features for the next generation high speed subsonic commercial transport pro-
pulsion system. A number of airline problems related to the selection of the per-
formance goal for such an engine have been presented with the objective of providing
guidance for advanced research projects. It is suggested that major improvements in
specific fuel consumption and engine specific weight will be difficult to achieve
and that as a consequence improvements in direct operating cost must come from other
technology areas. Several technology areas where reductions in direct operating
.cost might be obtained have been presented. The economic data presented by the engine
study contractors indicate significant economic penalty for achieving the noise and
pollution goals established'. It is' American Airlines' opinion that the economic assess-
ment tools used to study the impact of various design features and technology levels
is not providing adequate guidance. Recognizing that noise, pollution and total oper-
ating economics will be the driving forces in propulsion system design for the for-
seeable future strongly suggests that a program be initiated to develop the necessary
economic assessment tools to provide more accurate guidance for the' future.
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